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This article covers cases from Volumes 498 through 527 of the South
Western Reporter (Third Edition) and federal cases during the same
period that the authors believe are noteworthy to the jurisprudence on
the applicable subject.
I. INTRODUCTION
Continuing the history of recent Survey articles, the courts are continu-
ing to deal with issues of standing on challenges to non-judicial foreclo-
sures, particularly in the residential home sphere. Also, in the foreclosure
context, cases on text messages for a change of address and retroactive
appointment of substitutes have been addressed.
Contract interpretations, mostly in the debtor/creditor context, shed
further insight on drafting techniques for the practitioner. The use of
turnover order, email signatures (for which there is now a split of author-
ity among Texas appellate courts), and third party beneficiary require-
ments are also addressed.
With the recent hurricane and flooding issues in Texas, a number of
cases are instructive as to insurance coverage. Most importantly, perhaps,
is the Texas Supreme Court’s clarification of the premises liability statute,
including a matter of first impression on the second leg of the dual man-
date of foreseeability and reasonableness for criminal act cases.
As in past years, the courts, particularly the Texas Supreme Court, gave
practitioners practical guidance to assist with the interpretation of ambig-
uous contracts and the application of the statute of frauds. Although the
statute of frauds has historically been one rarely dealt with by courts or
practitioners, the issue seems to be arising with increasing frequency with
each Survey period. This year, a relatively large number of cases before
the courts hinged on application of the partial performance exception to
the statute of frauds. These cases provide valuable guidance to practition-
ers, and are discussed in more detail below.
Unfortunately, in a notable Texas Supreme Court case, Shields Limited
Partnership v. Bradberry,1 the supreme court did not provide the helpful
guidance desired by practitioners with respect to waiver of non-waiver
clauses. In fact, in the Shields case, the supreme court left practitioners
hopelessly confused about the best way to draft a non-waiver provision to
1. 526 S.W.3d 471 (Tex. 2017).
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ensure that it would not later be waived by the parties. In Shields, the
guidance offered by the supreme court can be boiled down to “we know
it when we see it” which, unfortunately, leaves practitioners looking for a
practical solution for their clients at a complete loss.
A number of illustrative cases dealing with conveyances and restric-
tions demonstrate the courts’ trend to avoid rules of interpretation and
drafting, and focus on the entirety of the document to discern intent.
Also, the supreme court strained to find home equity liens “not valid”
until cured and avoid a running of limitations that might bar claims by
borrowers. However, forfeiture is a remedy to be determined under the
loan documents pursuant to a breach of contract cause of action. Practi-
tioners should note changes to Texas Property Code Chapter 12, with the
legislative addition of Section 12.0071, giving a meaningful effect to an
expungement. This legislative change is prospective and arose in response
to the supreme court limiting the effect of an expungement to the notice
of lis pendens itself. Finally, the relatively new correction instrument stat-
ute has been refined as to what constitutes a non-material and material
correction.
II. MORTGAGES, LIENS AND FORECLOSURES
A. FORECLOSURE DETAILS
Bauder v. Alegria2 addresses the Texas Property Code Section
51.002(b)3 requirement that a notice of foreclosure must be served by
certified mail addressed to the debtor’s last known address. Here, the
notice address for the borrower in the loan documents was 704 Roosevelt
Street. Several default or payment reminders were sent to that address. In
May 2013, the lender sent a notice to cure to the Roosevelt address.
Before sending such notice, the lender sent the borrower a text message
stating that he had heard the borrower had sold the Roosevelt property
and that he assumed the borrower’s address on Neuman Street was her
primary residence. There were also text messages for an extended period
from the borrower requesting the lender to pick up payments at the
Neuman address. Later, the lender sent a foreclosure notice to the
Roosevelt address, but not to the Neuman address. The trustee fore-
closed and the borrower sued to set aside the foreclosure, claiming that
she did not receive proper notice. The foreclosure sale was set aside by
the trial court, finding that the lender had reasonable notice of her
change of address and that notice was sent to the wrong address. Since
the Roosevelt address was shown in the deed of trust, it was urged that
the borrower was required to give written notice of a change of address;
however, the deed of trust was silent as to the obligation to give a notice
of change of address. On appeal, the Fourteenth Houston Court of Ap-
peals held, based upon the texting back and forth regarding the Neuman
2. 480 S.W.3d 92 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.).
3. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.002(b) (West 2014).
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address, that the last known address of borrower as shown by the lender’s
records was the Neuman address. Consequently, practitioners should now
review both emails and text messages prior to a determination of the no-
tice address required by Texas foreclosure law.
In Calvillo v. Carrington Mortgage Services,4 the law firm retained by
the lender sent Calvillo a notice of acceleration and a foreclosure notice
on December 9th, but the notice letter was not picked up by Calvillo. The
notice was posted and filed on or about December 12th. A provision in
the notice stated that one or more of named substitute trustees would
conduct the foreclosure sale. On December 21st, an appointment of sub-
stitute trustees was executed, authorizing the persons named in the fore-
closure notice to act as substitute trustees. The foreclosure occurred on
January 3rd of the following year. After foreclosure, Calvillo sued claim-
ing, among other things, that the required twenty-one days’ notice of
foreclosure had not been properly given, because the substitute trustees
named in the notice were not appointed until December 21st, being
twelve days after the foreclosure notice and twelve days before the
foreclosure.
The El Paso Court of Appeals noted the general rule, stating
[a]lthough, as a general rule, a substitute trustee has no power to act
prior to his appointment, it has long been settled in Texas that when
a substitute trustee signs and posts a notice prior to the substitute
trustee’s appointment, the subsequent post-appointment acts of the
substitute trustee have the effect of ratifying and affirming his pre-
appointment acts.5
Further, the court noted that the appointment of substitute trustees, al-
though executed on December 21, was “designated to be effective as of
December 12.”6 Therefore, the court concluded that the subsequent ap-
pointment ratified the prior actions of the subsequently appointed substi-
tute trustees, which validated the prior notice of foreclosure sale.7
Sorrell v. Estate of Carlton8 dealt with substantial compliance in the
redemption of a property sold at a tax sale. Sorrell acquired certain prop-
erty, previously owned by the Estate of Carlton, at a tax sale. The Estate
attempted to redeem the property approximately one month prior to the
deadline for redemption. The statutory redemption provision requires
payment of: (1) the amount bid for the property; (2) the amount of deed
recording fees; (3) the amount paid for taxes, penalties, interest and costs;
and (4) a redemption premium of 25% of the aggregate total.9 The tender
by the Estate did not include the amount for taxes, penalties, interest and
costs, and the tender included a letter requiring execution of a redemp-
4. 487 S.W.3d 626 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, pet. denied).
5. Id. at 631 (citing Chandler v. Guar. Mortg. Co., 89 S.W.2d 250, 254 (Tex. Civ.
App.—San Antonio 1935, no writ)).
6. Id. at 632.
7. Id.
8. 504 S.W.3d 379 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. granted).
9. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 34.21 (West 2017).
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tion deed and a statement to notify the Estate if there were any addi-
tional claimed expenses, which would be “paid, upon review.”10
The Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals reviewed authority on
whether payments would constitute substantial compliance, noting that
the determination was based, on a case by case basis, on the size of the
amount paid and the size of the amount left unpaid, as well as the
promptness of the late payment.11 Other courts have concluded there was
substantial compliance in payment where the amount of shortage was
$172.72, and another where the amount was less than 1% of the amount
owed;12 however, in other cases the payment amount was not in substan-
tial compliance when the tender was short by $7,782 and $6,076.13 In the
subject case, the shortage in payment by the Estate was approximately
$11,700. Nevertheless, the amount tendered was not the sole factor for
substantial compliance.14 To effect a redemption after the tax sale, the
prior owner must make an unqualified tender of the required amounts
within the statutory time period; however, the Sorrell court would not
view the Estate’s tender as conditional merely for asking for the quitclaim
deed allowed by statute. The court distinguished Bluntson v. Wuensche
Services, Inc.15 because the tendering party asked for the tendered checks
to be held in trust pending the resolution of disputed costs, which was not
an unconditional tender. However, in Sorrell, the Estate did not condition
its offer on the resolution of any issue, nor did it threaten to dispute any
itemization by Sorrell by reason of the language that such other costs
would be paid “upon review.”16
Chief Justice Frost dissented noting that the statutory payment
amounts were clear and required and should be strictly construed, point-
ing out that if the purchaser at the tax sale refused to provide itemization,
the statutory regime provided an alternative means to determine the ex-
act amount needed to be tendered.17 Further, Chief Justice Frost took
issue as to whether the term “upon review” represented an unconditional
tender, concluding that such language was not an unconditional agree-
ment to pay the statutory requirements and, therefore, would not consti-
tute an unconditional tender.18
B. STANDING
EverBank, N.A. v. Seedergy Ventures, Inc.19 involved a deed of trust
which was bought and sold several times in a series of assignments. One
10. Sorrell, 504 S.W.3d at 382.
11. Id. at 383.
12. Id. at 384.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. 374 S.W.3d 503 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.).
16. Id. at 386.
17. Id. at 388, 389.
18. Id. at 390.
19. 499 S.W.3d 534 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.).
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assignment was executed in 2001 to Mortgage Electronic Registration
Systems, Inc. (MERS), but was not recorded until 2013. MERS assigned
the deed of trust to EverBank, but that assignment was recorded a month
before the assignment into MERS. Between the assignments to and from
MERS, the homeowners defaulted in paying homeowners association as-
sessments, and the homeowners association foreclosed and sold the prop-
erty to Seedergy. EverBank, as the assignee of the deed of trust, then
posted for foreclosure. Seedergy obtained a temporary restraining order,
claiming that EverBank lacked standing to foreclose. The Fourteenth
Houston Court of Appeals, quoting Texas Property Code Sections 51.002
and 51.0025, noted that “a party has standing to initiate a nonjudicial
foreclosure sale if the party is a mortgagee,”20 which “includes the
grantee, beneficiary, owner, or holder of a . . . deed of trust, or ‘if the
security interest has been assigned of record, the last person to whom the
security interest has been assigned of record.’”21
Seedergy argued that EverBank did not have standing to foreclose as a
matter of law because (1) EverBank was not the last assignee of record of
the deed of trust; (2) EverBank was not the holder of the note; and (3)
EverBank was not the owner of the note with the right to enforce it. In its
first point, Seedergy argued that there were three breaks in EverBank’s
chain of assignments, any one of which would defeat EverBank’s standing
to foreclose. The first break alleged was the assignment into Inland Mort-
gage Corporation which predated the deed of trust in favor of Kellibrook
(the original mortgagee) based on the notary dates (December 18, 1996
for the deed of trust, and December 13, 1996 for the assignment). But the
court concluded Seedergy did not conclusively establish that the assign-
ment predated the deed of trust, since the assignment specifically refer-
enced the prior recording information for the deed of trust, proving the
deed of trust was recorded at the time the assignment was executed.22
The second assignment break allegedly occurred in the assignment
from MERS to EverBank without specifying a concurrent assignment of
the underlying note. Seedergy argued the familiar “split the note” theory
of action, relying on an 1872 U.S. Supreme Court case23 which dealt with
Colorado Territory law and federal common law. But, the court rejected
such authority, stating
[i]n Texas, nonjudicial foreclosure sales are governed by the Texas
Property Code, not by the law set forth in Carpenter. And as this
court has previously explained, there is no provision in the Texas
20. Id. at 538 (quoting TEX. PROP. CODE §§ 51.002–.0025 (West 2014)).
21. Id. However, in dictum, the court wanders off-point stating that “[e]ven if a party
does not have a recorded interest in a security instrument, the party may still have standing
to foreclose if the party is the holder or owner of a note secured by the instrument. This
rule derives from the common law maxim, now codified in Texas, that the mortgage follows
the note.” Id. (citing Campbell v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS
4030 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, no pet.) (dealing specifically with a security interest in per-
sonalty); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 9.203(g) (West 2017)).
22. Id. at 539.
23. Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. 271 (1872).
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Property Code that requires a foreclosing party to prove its status as
holder or owner of the note.24
The third alleged break in title occurred between the assignment from
the original mortgagee to Inland and the subsequent assignment from Ir-
win Mortgage Corporation to MERS. Inland and Irwin were the same
entity, which had changed its name; consequently, Seedergy did not prove
that EverBank lacked standing to foreclose.25
Further, Seedergy pursued its theory that EverBank was neither the
holder nor the owner of the note.26 But, in fact, EverBank held the origi-
nal note indorsed in blank. Therefore, the court concluded that “[w]hen
indorsed in blank, an instrument becomes payable to bearer and may be
negotiated by transfer of possession alone until specially indorsed.”27
Under Texas law, a holder of a note indorsed in blank is presumed to be
entitled to enforcement of the instrument merely by showing possession
of that instrument; such holder is not also required to establish an unbro-
ken chain of title.28
Lamell v. OneWest Bank, FSB29 involved the transfer of servicing to
IndyMac, a division of OneWest, on a home refinanced by Lamell.
Lamell protested the property tax on his home, but did not pay the con-
tested portion of the taxes. OneWest advanced the funds to pay those
taxes and increased Lamell’s payments to cover the costs. Lamell sued
Harris County Appraisal District and the Harris County Tax Assessor-
Collector and stopped paying on his mortgage. When OneWest
threatened foreclosure, Lamell added OneWest to the lawsuit. Among
other things, Lamell challenged the assignment of his loan to OneWest
and the securitization of the loan based on alleged problems, relying on
Morlock, L.L.C. v. Nationstar Mortg., L.L.C.30 The Fourteenth Houston
Court of Appeals held that Lamell had standing to make the challenges,
since a homeowner’s interest in the title to his property gives the home-
owner a sufficient justiciable interest to advance arguments challenging
the deed of trust.31
In his fraud claim, Lamell asserted that the deed of trust was void be-
cause it was securitized in violation of the terms of the applicable Pooling
and Servicing Agreement, because it was not assigned to the securitiza-
24. EverBank, 499 S.W.3d at 539–40.
25. Id. at 540.
26. Seedergy relied on Nueces Cty. v. MERSCORP Holdings, Inc., No. 2:12-CV-00131,
2013 WL 3353948 (S.D. Tex. July 13, 2013), which held that MERS was not a lender, nor
holder, nor note owner, but was acting merely as the nominee or agent of the lender.
However, in the subject case, MERS was a beneficiary, not a nominee or agent for another
lender.Id. at 540–41.
27. Id. at 541.
28. Id.
29. 485 S.W.3d 53 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied).
30. 447 S.W.3d 42 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied) (holding,
in a suit to removed cloud on title, that the homeowner had a justiciable interest to chal-
lenge the deed of trust).
31. Lamell, 485 S.W.3d at 58.
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tion trust before its start-up date, and because there is no evidence that
the deed of trust was transferred into the trust by the depositor. How-
ever, neither Lamell nor the court found any authority that the breach of
such securitization agreement rendered the deed of trust void.32 There-
fore, Lamell’s fraud claim failed.
Lamell also challenged the right of OneWest, as the mortgage servicer,
to foreclose if it was not the owner and holder of the note. The court held
that OneWest did not need to be the owner or holder of the note to fore-
close since OneWest was acting as the mortgagee servicer on behalf of the
syndication trust, which held the deed of trust, relying on Texas Property
Code Section 51.0025, that a mortgagee or a mortgage servicer may con-
duct non-judicial foreclosure proceedings without proving its status as the
owner and holder of the note.33
C. OTHER ISSUES
Carmel Financial Corporation v. Castro34 involved the assertion by
Carmel Financial that its security interest in a single family house water
treatment system was a valid lien against the entire real property. Though
the financing statement in favor of Carmel Financial preceded the first
lien mortgage on the house, priority lien status as to the real property was
not granted to Carmel. The Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals con-
strued the language of the security interest to relate solely to the water
treatment system and not to the home, refuting Carmel’s reading of
U.C.C. Sections 9.334(d) and 9.604(b).35 Under U.C.C. Section 9.334(d),
a perfected purchase money security interest, which arises before the
goods become fixtures, takes priority over a conflicting lien on the real
property. U.C.C. Section 9.604(b) allows, with respect to goods that are
or are to become fixtures, a secured party to foreclose under either the
U.C.C. or in accordance with real property rights. The court noted that
the security agreement and financing statement did not describe the real
property as collateral, but limited the collateral to the water treatment
system, and that neither of such U.C.C. sections “operates independently
to create a security interest in real property that the underlying security
agreement did not authorize.”36 Therefore, Carmel’s fixture filing did not
create a lien on real property and was not prior to the interest of first
lienholder on the real property.
Villanova v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation37 concerned the
sufficiency of a summary judgment motion and affidavit in connection
with an alleged wrongful foreclosure. Villanova obtained a loan from
Home Savings of American in the amount of $693,000, secured by the
32. Id.
33. Id. at 62 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 57.0025 (West 2014)).
34. 514 S.W.3d 291 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied).
35. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.334(d), 9.604(b) (West 2017).
36. Castro, 514 S.W.3d at 296.
37. 511 S.W.3d 88 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, no pet.).
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property being acquired (Frisco Home), and by an additional piece of
collateral being Villanova’s home in Corpus Christi (Corpus Christi
Home). The closing documentation, typical for a home loan, included an
affidavit of intent to permanently occupy the Frisco Home as Villanova’s
residence, and covenants in the deed of trust to occupy the Frisco Home
as his primary residence and not to transfer an interest in the home with-
out the lender’s approval. In breach of these covenants, Villanova con-
veyed the Frisco Home to Christina Roth, a woman he had met months
earlier on an internet dating site, www.sugardaddyforme.com, with Roth
agreeing to pay Villanova $66,000 at maturity of a note she executed in
favor of Villanova. Upon discovery of the breach, the lender filed for
foreclosure, which was suspended upon reaching a settlement agreement
requiring Villanova to make certain payments, agree to refinance the
house by a certain date, or in failing to do so, to sell the house by a later
date. Villanova breached all of those requirements and the lender eventu-
ally foreclosed all of its collateral, being the Frisco Home and the Corpus
Christi Home.
Villanova sued; the lender filed for summary judgment and supported
that motion for summary judgment with an affidavit of Paula Chin, the
Vice President of Loan Servicing and Default Operations. The affidavit in
this case did not specify whether Chin was the applicable vice president
during the relevant time period or how her job duties in that role af-
forded her the knowledge about the specific facts in the case. An affidavit
in support of a summary judgment motion must be based on personal
knowledge of the affiant.38 But, the El Paso Court of Appeals concluded
that Chin did not have the requisite personal knowledge, based on the
affidavit’s defects due to lack of information concerning how she had per-
sonal knowledge.39 This case is instructive to practitioners on what type
of personal knowledge must be proved to be an effective affidavit in sup-
port of a summary judgment motion. A mere recitation of facts is not
sufficient, in and of itself, and the title or position of a person does not
carry with it an implied level of personal knowledge. The court required
that statements in such an affidavit “need factual specificity such as place,
time, and exact nature of the alleged facts.”40 In other words, the affidavit




In LSREF2 Cobalt (TX), LLC v. 410 Centre LLC,42 the Note and
38. Id. at 94 (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. ANN. 166a(f)).
39. Id. at 95.
40. Id.
41. Id. (citing Valenzuela v. State & Cty. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 317 S.W.3d 550, 553–54
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.)).
42. 501 S.W.3d 626 (Tex. App.—San Antonio, 2016, pet. denied).
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Guaranty waived the borrower’s and guarantor’s rights to the statutory
anti-deficiency claim.43 There was a default and the parties began negoti-
ating a settlement. Before negotiations began, the parties entered into a
pre-negotiation agreement. The pre-negotiation agreement contained the
following provision:
3. No Waiver by Obligor. [The borrower and guarantor] ha[ve] not
in any way waived any rights or remedies it may have prior to and
until the date of the Agreement with respect to the Loan or any of
the Loan Documents, or otherwise available at law or in equity ei-
ther directly in an action against Creditor, as a defense against any
action by [the lender] against [the borrower or guarantor] or any
other civil proceeding or otherwise.44
The borrower and guarantor acknowledged that such anti-deficiency
right had been waived in the loan documents, but argued that Paragraph
3 of the pre-negotiation agreement revived their rights under that section.
The San Antonio Court of Appeals disagreed.45
Paragraph 1 of the pre-negotiation agreement stated that nothing that
occurred during settlement discussions would affect the parties’ rights,
remedies or defenses under the loan documents.46 It further provided
that the loan documents would not be affected by anything unless agreed
to in writing.47 There was no settlement or written modification of the
loan documents. The pre-negotiation agreement, by its express terms, set
the parameters for these negotiations and specified the precise proce-
dures for modifying the loan documents and the guaranty. Thus, the com-
mercial setting and other objective factors indicated that the pre-
negotiation agreement was a stand-alone agreement that did not alter the
parties’ legal rights under the existing agreements.48
Rainier Income Fund I, Ltd. v. Gans49 involved the guaranty of the
repayment of partner loans and capital contributions. The guaranties exe-
cuted by Gans provided that the guarantied obligations were to be paid if
the partner loans and contributions were not repaid in full upon the liqui-
dation of the partnerships. The partnership agreements provided that the
partnerships would be dissolved and liquidated upon the occurrence of
various dissolving events, including “a sale by the Partnership of the en-
tire Project and the collection of all amounts derived from any such sale
or sales.”50 The partnerships were developing two real estate projects
with bank loans. Ultimately the projects failed and the bank foreclosed.
The question presented was whether the foreclosure was a “dissolving
event” giving rise to the guarantor’s liability under the guaranties.
43. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.003 (West 2014).
44. Id.; LSREF2 Cobalt, 501 S.W.3d at 631.
45. Id. at 634.
46. Id. at 632.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 634.
49. 501 S.W.3d 617 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2016, pet. denied).
50. Id. at 623.
2018] Real Property 367
The Dallas Court of Appeals construed the guaranties according to the
rule of strictissimi juris, requiring the terms of a guaranty to be strictly
followed and not be extended beyond its precise terms by construction or
implication.51 There was a “sale” of the properties since legal title to the
properties was transferred in exchange for money; but, to the court, the
question was who sold the properties.52 Rainier argued that once the
partnerships did not own and operate the commercial real estate projects,
whether the disposition was by a voluntary sale or foreclosure, the appli-
cable provision was triggered. But the court disagreed and looked at the
plain language of the partnership agreements, “which specifically re-
quire[d] the sale to be ‘by the Partnership’ for a dissolving event to oc-
cur.”53 Since the properties were sold by reason of a foreclosure sale, the
strict language triggering the guaranties was not satisfied.54
Additionally, the partnership agreements required “the collection of all
amounts derived from any such sale or sales.”55 Obviously, the partner-
ships did not collect the foreclosure sales proceeds. The court concluded
that Gans’s guaranty was only applicable if the investors would receive
payment when the properties were sold by the partnership and funds
were received in exchange, specifying “[i]n other words, the purpose of
the guaranties was to preclude the general partner from selling the
properties and then refusing to distribute the funds.”56 This case repre-
sents another drafting lesson for the practitioner to be extremely careful
in the wording of guaranties, especially as to what constitutes the trigger-
ing event for the guarantor’s obligation to be operative.
Kartsotis v. Bloch57 involved contribution between co-guarantors pur-
suant to a Contribution and Indemnity Agreement (CIA), which had two
primary operative provisions. Section 1 of the CIA provided “[i]f any
Guarantor makes a payment in respect of the Obligations, such Guaran-
tor shall have the rights of contribution and reimbursement set forth be-
low.”58 The triggering provision was Section 2 of the CIA which provided
[i]f any [Paid Guarantor] makes a payment upon or in respect of the
Obligations that is greater than it’s Pro Rata Percentage [1/3] of the
Obligations, the Paid Guarantor shall have the right to receive from
the other Guarantors who have not paid their Pro Rata Percentage
. . . an amount such that the net payments made by the Paid Guaran-
tor in respect of the Obligations shall be shared by Guarantors pro
rata in proportion to their Pro Rata Percentage.59
51. Id. at 622.




56. Id. at 624.
57. 503 S.W.3d 506 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2016, pet. denied).
58. Id. at 512.
59. Id. at 512–13.
368 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 4
The three principals, who were the guarantors under the CIA, entered
into a number of financing transactions involving the Black Bull Run De-
velopment (a Montana golf course community), including (1) a construc-
tion loan (BBR Loan) with La Jolla Bank (transferred to OneWest
Bank), which had been guaranteed by Bloch; (2) an indemnity from
Bloch in favor of Commonwealth Title to indemnify against mechanics
liens on the property; and (3) a golf equipment lease with Wells Fargo
Financial Leasing, which Bloch had guaranteed. Also involved was an ad-
ditional loan to CLB Capital (the partnership in which the three partners
participated) from Guaranty Bank, guaranteed by each of the three par-
ties. Ultimately, the Black Bull Run project was unsuccessful and the
BBR Loan was settled by Bloch and another guarantor, Cureton, by the
payment of money. The Commonwealth Title indemnity and the Wells
Fargo leasing equipment loan were subjects of lawsuits which were also
settled by Bloch (collectively, the BBR Settlements). The Guaranty Bank
loan was extended twice and then finally matured. Kartsotis paid his
share of the guarantor’s debt on the Guaranty Bank loan, and when
Bloch refused to pay his share, Kartsotis paid Bloch’s share for him in
order to retire the Guaranty Bank loan.60 The parties sued each other
under the CIA, and upon review of a summary judgment, the Dallas
Court of Appeals interpreted the meaning of the CIA.61
The crux of this decision involved the interpretation of the defined
term “Obligations” in the CIA. Bloch’s interpretation was that the CIA
covered any payments made by one of the guarantors in connection with
the related financings. On the other hand, Kartsotis interpreted the CIA
to only refer to payments made in excess of the designated percentage of
the primary obligations related to the financing transactions. The pay-
ment by Bloch for the BBR Settlement was less than one-third of the
debt owed on the primary obligations was covered by the CIA. The court
interpreted Section 2 of the CIA, the triggering clause, to be triggered
only upon a payment of the Obligations in an amount that exceeded the
threshold test (i.e., one-third of the Obligations) before being entitled to
a reimbursement or contribution.62 The CIA defined Obligations as both
“Future Obligations” and “Existing Obligations,” with the Existing Obli-
gations being set forth on an exhibit to the CIA (which specified the BBR
Loan and the Wells Fargo lease, but not the Commonwealth Title indem-
nity).63 Consequently, the court concluded that since Bloch’s payment
with respect to the BBR Settlement was less than one-third of the out-
standing Obligations, then the triggering event (being a payment greater
than one-third of the total debt) was not activated, and no contribution
was required.64
60. Id. at 511–13.
61. Id. at 515.
62. Id. at 516–17.
63. Id. at 517.
64. Id. at 518.
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This case presents a lesson for practitioners in the drafting of indemnity
or contribution agreements, particularly as it relates to the description of
both the obligations for which a contribution or indemnity is applicable,
and the threshold or trigger at which contributions begin. Further, in in-
terpreting the definition of “Obligations,” the court held the provisions in
the contract’s recitals were somewhat inconsistent with the provisions in
the body of the contract and that contract recitals are not deemed strictly
part of the contract and will not control over the operative provisions in
the body of the contract.65 General contract construction favors the spe-
cific provisions (such as in the body of the contract) over general recital
provisions. As a drafting lesson, specific and important defined terms
should probably be dealt with in the body of the contract as opposed to
recitals.
B. JUDGMENT INDEXING OF HISPANIC NAMES
Austin v. Coface Seguro De Credito Mex., S.A. De C.V.66 is an impor-
tant case for all practitioners with respect to Hispanic naming conven-
tions. In this case, a bank obtained a judgment in Mexico and registered it
in a Texas state court using the first and second surname of the debtor
(Rafael Augusto Martin Ojeda Miranda). The bank then filed the judg-
ment in the county records and the county clerk indexed the judgment
under the last name of “Mirandas” instead of “Miranda.” The bank later
discovered that the debtor owned a house in Texas which had been sold
to a third-party buyer. The name on the warranty deed was Rafael Ojeda.
The bank attempted to foreclose on the house and the buyer sued. The
trial court sided with the bank and the First Houston Court of Appeals
affirmed, stating that if a “good faith purchaser acquires real property
without actual or constructive notice of a lien, from the real property
records or elsewhere, he takes the property free of the lien.”67 However,
“a purchaser is charged with knowledge of every ‘recital, reference, and
reservation’ that appears with in the chain of title.”68 In the case at hand,
the real property records contained a lis pendes listing the debtor’s full
name which, in the eyes of the appellate court, gave the purchaser “con-
structive knowledge of Ojeda Miranda’s full name.”69
C. TURNOVER ORDERS
Gillet v. ZUPT, LLC70 deals with turnover orders. Gillet owned forty-
five percent of ZUPT, which was in the business of subsea surveying ser-
vices. Gillet eventually decided to leave ZUPT and provided notice under
a buy-sell agreement forcing the other ZUPT members to purchase his
65. Id.
66. 506 S.W.3d 707 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied).
67. Id. at 712.
68. Id. at 712–13 (citing Waggoner v. Morrow, 932 S.W.2d 627, 632 (Tex. App.—Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1996, no pet.)).
69. Id. at 713.
70. 523 S.W.3d 749 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.).
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interest in ZUPT. A few months after such purchase notice was given,
Gillet ceased his employment at ZUPT and began working for a competi-
tor. Although his employment was with a competitor, Gillet never re-
signed as a member of ZUPT and at the time of the suit continued to own
a forty-five percent interest. An appraiser was engaged to determine the
value of Gillet’s interest, presumably required under the buy-sell agree-
ment.71 The appraisal valued the entire company at $1,600,000, based on
a sale of ZUPT, in its entirety, and based on the assumption that Gillet
would sign a standard non-compete agreement.72 Gillet refused to sign a
non-compete agreement and the appraiser revised the value of Gillet’s
forty-five percent to be only $229,000.73 Gillet sued ZUPT, which coun-
terclaimed alleging misappropriation of confidential information and
trade secrets and breach of fiduciary duty. The case was ultimately arbi-
trated, with a determination that Gillet was owed $499,050 for his forty-
five percent interest, and that upon payment of such sum, Gillet should
surrender all of his interest in ZUPT. Further, the arbitrator awarded
ZUPT damages of $1,869,164 for breach of fiduciary duty relating to dis-
closure of trade secrets.74 Then the trial court signed a final judgment
confirming the arbitrator’s award, and ZUPT sought a turnover order
and receiver.
The trial court’s turnover order and appointment of a receiver could be
reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion.75 The Texas Turnover
Statute76 generally provides the authority for a turnover order “to reach
assets of a judgment debtor that are otherwise difficult to attach or levy
on by ordinary legal process.”77 In his challenge to the order, Gillet ar-
gued that the trial court did not have any evidence that Gillet owned any
nonexempt property subject to a turnover order. Gillet’s argument is
based on the statutory prohibition from issuing a turnover order of prop-
erty exempt from execution by any statute.78
In acknowledging this statutory prohibition, the Fourteenth Houston
Court of Appeals noted that a trial court is not required to specify the
property subject to a turnover order, and that lack of evidence supporting
the turnover order is not an automatic invalidation but is only a relevant
71. Id. at 752.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 753.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 31.002(a) (West 2017).
77. Gillet, 523 S.W.3d at 754. The exact statutory language reads: “(a) A judgment
creditor is entitled to aid from a court of appropriate jurisdiction through injunction or
other means in order to reach property to obtain satisfaction on the judgment if the judg-
ment debtor owns property, including present or future rights to property, that is not ex-
empt from attachment, execution, or seizure for the satisfaction of liabilities.” TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 31.002(a) (West 2017). Note that in the 2017 Texas Legislative
Session, one of the requirements (that the property “cannot readily be attached or levied
on by ordinary legal process”) was removed from the statutory language. However, this
case was decided prior to such removal. Act of June 15, 2017, 85th Leg., R.S., ch. 966, § 1,
2017 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 966 (codified at TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 31.002(a)).
78. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 31.002(f) (West 2017).
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consideration.79 The only evidence that ZUPT presented at the hearing
for the turnover order, was evidence of the constable’s nulla bona return
of the writ of execution, and two constable officers who testified that no
exempt property of Gillet was located by such deputies.80 Nevertheless,
the appellate court concluded there was sufficient evidence for the trial
court’s conclusion based solely on the trial court’s right to take judicial
notice of its judgment rendering damages to Gillet of $499,000 which it
had previously ordered.81 The court noted other cases acknowledging
that judgment debts were appropriate for a turnover order.82 Also, the
court noted that the purpose behind the turnover statute was “to facili-
tate the collection of assets such as ‘contract rights receivable, accounts
receivable, commissions receivable and similar acts to property or rights
to receive money at a future date.’”83 Finally, it was held that Gillet’s
nonexempt ownership interest in ZUPT was also subject to judicial no-
tice.84 With such judicial notice of nonexempt assets, and based on the
evidence of the returned writ of execution as nulla bona, the appellate
court concluded that the trial court had sufficient authority to issue the
turnover order.85 However, note that the issue regarding the nulla bona
writ of execution would no longer be applicable under the 2017 statute
which deleted the requirement that the assets could not readily be at-
tached or levied on by ordinary legal process.86
The appellate court’s ruling specifically approved of the trial court’s
turnover order which included the nonexempt property in the form of
Gillet’s judgment against ZUPT and Gillet’s ownership interest in
ZUPT.87 However, the appellate court concluded that the turnover order
as to all other assets which might be exempt was wrongful and an abuse
of judicial discretion; thereby sustaining the court order in part and re-
versing it as to the other assets mentioned in the turnover order.88
Gillet also challenged the turnover order alleging that the appropriate
remedy as to Gillet’s membership interests in ZUPT was exclusively a
charging order.89 While acknowledging this statutory provision, the court
79. Gillet, 523 S.W.3d at 754. As to the nonspecificity of property in a turnover order,
see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 31.002(h) (West 2017).
80. Gillet, 523 S.W.3d at 754.
81. Id. at 755.
82. See Goodier v. Duncan, 651 S.W.2d 25 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1983, writ ref’d. n.r.e.)
(a judgment is an obligation owed by a party to pay money to the other); Milwaukee Cty.
v. N.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 275 (1935) (the judgment is an obligation to pay money in
the nature of a debt).
83. Gillet, 523 S.W.3d at 756.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 756.
86. See id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 757 (citing Stanley v. Reef Sec., Inc., 314 S.W.3d 659, 666–67 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2010, no pet.).
89. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 101.112(d) (West 2012) (“[t]he entry of a charging
order is the exclusive remedy by which a judgment creditor of a member or any other
owner of a membership interest may satisfy a judgment out of the judgment debtor’s mem-
bership interest.”) (emphasis added).
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considered this to be a case of first impression where the judgment credi-
tor was actually the entity for which the charging order was sought.90 The
court reviewed the rationale for such exclusivity provision, concluding
that a “charging order was developed to prevent a judgment creditor’s
disruption of an entity’s business by forcing an execution sale . . . to sat-
isfy a debt of the individual partner or member.”91 Relying on dicta in
Khan v. Chaundhry,92 the court reached its conclusion based on two rea-
sons, the first being that the charging order was actually sought by the
“entity from which the membership interest derived,”93 and the second,
being that the charging order did not relate to the monetization of a judg-
ment debt, the transfer of which was specifically required by the order.94
In a final argument, Gillet alleged the turnover order was a collateral
attack on the final judgment because the order required the transfer of
the ZUPT membership interest in consideration of payment of funds
which Gillet had not yet received.95 The court sustained Gillet’s challenge
since the turnover order was inconsistent with the final judgment. Conse-
quently, practitioners should be careful in seeking turnover orders to ver-
ify they are consistent with the actual judgment upon which they are
based.
D. EMAIL SIGNATURES
Khoury v. Tomlinson96 involved a guaranty of a loan and whether an
email constitutes a signature for purposes of a statute of frauds. Tomlin-
son was the president of PetroGulf, Ltd. which entered into an arrange-
ment with its investor, Khoury, such that the company would pay Khoury
a 14% interest on his investment along with a 10% interest in the net
profits of the company. This transaction was initiated with a subscription
agreement and evidenced by a signed promissory note. Eventually,
Khoury became disenchanted, and, in a meeting, Tomlinson agreed to
repay Khoury’s loan over a four or five year period. A week after the
meeting, Khoury emailed Tomlinson summarizing the agreements
reached during that meeting, to which Tomlinson responded “[w]e are in
agreement.”97
When Tomlinson failed to make any such payments, Khoury sued al-
leging breach of contract to which Tomlinson asserted a statute of frauds
defense. At trial, the jury found in favor of Khoury on his contract claims,
and Tomlinson filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
90. Id. at 757.
91. Id.
92. 2016 WL 1600444, at *4 n.1 (failure of the judgment debtor to advance the exclu-
sivity argument in his appeal was sole basis for ruling).
93. Gillet, 523 S.W.3d at 758.
94. Id.
95. The actual judgment language required “Gillet surrender his ownership interest
‘upon payment of this amount.’”Id. at 759.
96. 518 S.W.3d 568 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.).
97. Id. at 573.
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alleging the contract was barred by the statute of frauds because it was
too indefinite and while his email constituted a written response, it was
not signed as required under the statute of frauds.98
In analyzing the statute of frauds argument,99 the First Houston Court
of Appeals noted evidence that the initial email was sent by Khoury, and
a response was sent by Tomlinson. Though Tomlinson’s name was not in
the body of the email, his name and email address appeared in the
“from” field of the email.100 In analyzing whether a name in the “from”
field of an email constituted a signature for purposes of the statute of
frauds, the court first looked at the Texas Uniform Electronic Transaction
Act (UETA).101 UETA applies to: a “Transaction,” defined as “an action
or set of actions occurring between two or more persons related to the
conduct of business, commercial, or governmental affairs,”102 and to
“electronic records and electronic signatures related to a Transaction.”103
UETA defines an “electronic record” as “a record created, generated,
sent, communicated, received, or stored by electronic means” and an
“electronic signature” as “an electronic sound, symbol or process at-
tached to or logically associated with a record and executed or adopted
by a person with the intent to sign the record.”104 The appellate court
concluded that a name or email address in the “from” field satisfied the
UETA requirement of a symbol logically associated with a record. The
court then addressed the signature requirement, noting that an electronic
signature is not the equivalent of “signed.”105 However, under both case
law outlined by the court and under UETA,106 the ultimate issue is a
question of the intent of a party to adopt an agreement. Therefore, the
establishment of the “from” field in the email, although set up prior to
98. Id.
99. The Texas Statute of Frauds reads: “a promise by one person to answer for the
debt . . . of another person,” TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 26.01(b)(2), “is not enforceable
unless the promise or agreement, or a memorandum of it, is (1) in writing; and (2) signed
by the party to be charged with the promise or agreement.” TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 26.01(a)(1)–(2) (West 2014).
100. Khoury, 518 S.W.3d at 575.
101. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 322.001–.021 (West 2015).
102. Id. § 322.002(15).
103. Id. § 322.003(a).
104. Id. §§ 322.002(6), (7).
105. Khoury, 518 S.W.3d at 576.
106. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 322.002, cmt. 7 (West 2015), which in relevant
part reads as follows: “Whether any particular record is ‘signed’ is a question of fact. Proof
of that fact must be made under other applicable law.” This Act simply assures that the
signature may be accomplished through electronic means, “including one’s name as part of
an electronic email communication may also suffice . . . . It also may be shown that the
requisite intent was not present and accordingly the symbol, sound or process did not
amount to a signature . . . . In any case the critical element is the intention to execute or
adopt the sound or symbol or process for the purpose of signing the related record. The
definition requires that the signor execute or adopt the sound, symbol, or process with the
intent to sign the record.” However, the essential attribute of a signature involves applying
a sound, symbol, or process with an intent to do a legally significant act. It is that intention
that is understood in the law as a part of the word “signed,” without the need for a
definition.
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sending the email, did not preclude the same from being a signature.107
The court also found additional authority supporting this condition, in-
cluding the The New Oxford American Dictionary, Black’s Law Diction-
ary, and other scholarly publications, and from decisions in other
jurisdictions.108
The opinion in the subject case is contrary to the position taken by the
Fort Worth Court of Appeals in Cunningham v. Zurich American Insur-
ance Co.109 In that case, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals found that a
signature line at the end of an email did not constitute a signature. Al-
though that court discussed issues concerning whether the signature block
was generated automatically or manually inserted by the email respon-
dent, it ultimately concluded the issue on the basis of an intent to form a
contract, noting “no evidence suggests that the information was typed
purposefully rather than generated automatically, [or] that Grabouski in-
tended the typing of her name to be her signature.”110
Nevertheless, and departing from the Cunningham decision, the First
Houston Court of Appeals held in Khoury that the statute of frauds does
not require an intent to be bound; rather only an intent to sign.111 Conse-
quently, the court concluded the “email name or address in the ‘from’
field satisfies the definition of a signature under existing law.”112 With
such a disagreement among two appellate courts, practitioners may ex-
pect the Texas Supreme Court to settle the issue.
E. THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES
In First Bank v. Brumitt,113 the Texas Supreme Court addressed third
party beneficiaries in the context of a loan commitment. In this case,
Oprea, as president of DTSG, Ltd., sought to acquire from Brumitt all of
the equity interest in Southway Systems, Inc. Oprea approached First
Bank, which assured Oprea that a loan could be obtained in a timely
manner to facilitate the acquisition. Nevertheless, the bank failed to de-
liver a loan, giving an excuse virtually every month for delaying the loan
closing. Ultimately, DTSG and Brumitt sued the bank for their failure to
perform under one of three different loan commitments issued by the
bank for financing of such equity acquisition. At trial, First Bank was
found in breach of the contract, and an award in favor of Brumitt was
granted, which award and rights to recover as a third party beneficiary
were affirmed on appeal to the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals.114
The supreme court reviewed the law on third party beneficiaries, con-
cluding Brumitt did not satisfy the requirements to establish himself as a
107. Khoury, 518 S.W.3d at 576.
108. Id. at 577.
109. 352 S.W.3d 519 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, pet. denied).
110. Id. at 578.
111. Khoury, 518 S.W.3d at 578.
112. Id. at 579.
113. 519 S.W.3d 95 (Tex. 2017).
114. Id. at 101.
2018] Real Property 375
third party beneficiary of the contract with a right to sue for breach
thereof. In reaching this conclusion, the supreme court noted the stan-
dard rule that “the benefits and burdens of a contract belong solely to the
contracting parties,”115 with the exception for persons who qualify as a
third party beneficiary.116 The requirement for a third party beneficiary
right is dependent upon the contracting party’s intent to provide a benefit
to such third party.117 Further, the fact that Brumitt would have benefit-
ted from the sale of his assets by means of the First Bank financing was
not sufficient to create a third party beneficiary status.118 An expected
benefit from a third party does not in and of itself constitute such party as
a third party beneficiary.119 Thus, the issue was resolved by an analysis of
“the contract’s language, construed as a whole.”120
After detailing numerous cases both supporting a third party benefici-
ary claim and denying a third party beneficiary claim, the supreme court
concluded that none of the three loan commitment letters expressly indi-
cated the parties’ intention to make Brumitt a third party beneficiary,121
and the mere purpose of the letter, being the financing of the acquisition
of the equity interest in Subway, which would have benefitted Brumitt,
could not be relied upon as clear intent to make Brumitt a third party
beneficiary.122 While this case does not provide any change in jurispru-
dence on third party beneficiaries, it does serve as a reminder to practi-
tioners representing sellers, that if they anticipate a loan commitment
breach by the purchaser’s lender to be actionable by such seller, express
third party beneficiary language must be included in the loan commit-
ment to the purchaser.
IV. LANDLORD/TENANT/LEASES
A. SECURITY DEPOSITS
Although not a groundbreaking case, FP Stores, Inc. v. Tramontina US,
Inc.123 is an important case to bring to the attention of commercial real
estate practitioners because it is the first time a court has addressed the
“bad faith” element of Section 93.011 of the Texas Property Code and
only the sixth time a court has provided any guidance on Section
93.011.124 Section 93.011 of the Texas Property Code was enacted to im-
pose liability on a commercial landlord who retains a security deposit in
115. Id. at 102.
116. Id.
117. Id. (citing S. Tex. Water Auth. v. Lomas, 223 S.W.3d 304, 306 (Tex. 2017) (per
curiam)).
118. Id. (citing Sharyland Water Supply Corp. v. City of Alton, 354 S.W.3d 407 (Tex.
2011)).
119. Id. (citing Banker v. Breaux, 128 S.W.2d 23 (1939)).
120. Id. (citing Southland Royalty Co. v. PanAm. Petr. Corp., 378 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Tex.
1964); Citizens Nat’l Bank in Abilene v. Tex. & P.R. Co., 150 S.W.2d 1003, 1006 (1941)).
121. Id. at 104.
122. Id. at 104, 105.
123. 512 S.W.3d 684 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied).
124. Id. at 691 n.3.
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bad faith.125
In FP Stores, the tenant sued the landlord for breach of contract and
retaining a security deposit in bad faith.126 The applicable provision of the
sublease provided that “within 60 days after Sublessee surrenders the
leased premises and provides written notice to Sublessor of Sublessees
forwarding address, Sublessor will refund the security deposit less any
amounts applied toward amounts owed by Sublessee or other charges au-
thorized by this sublease.”127 The provisions in the sublease were remark-
ably similar to the requirements of Section 93.011.128 The primary
difference being that Section 93.011 includes a presumption of bad faith if
a landlord fails to act within such sixty day period. The provision provides
a penalty for such “bad faith” in an “amount equal to the sum of $100,
three times the portion of the deposit wrongfully withheld and reasonable
attorneys’ fees.”129 Under the provisions of Section 93.011, the burden
falls on the landlord to prove that any retention of a security deposit is
reasonable and not in bad faith.130 In FP Stores, the evidence presented
at trial clearly established that the landlord had not returned the security
deposit within the required sixty day period.131 As a result, the trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of the tenant.132 The landlord ap-
pealed the grant of summary judgment, and the First Houston Court of
Appeals agreed that there was sufficient evidence presented at trial that
the landlord may have acted in good faith when it failed to return the
security deposit and, as a result, summary judgment was inappropriate.133
Because the court of appeals was interpreting the “bad faith” require-
ment for the first time, the court reviewed other Texas court interpreta-
tions of Section 92.109 of the Texas Property Code, a parallel statute that
applies only to residential leases, to aid in its analysis.134 The court ulti-
mately held that under Section 93.011 of the Texas Property Code “a
commercial landlord retains a tenant’s security deposit in bad faith if it
retains the security deposit in honest disregard of the tenant’s rights or
with the intent to deprive the tenant of a lawful refund.”135
The decision of the court made it abundantly clear that, in its opinion,
any court interpreting Section 93.011 should presume that a landlord ac-
ted in bad faith if the tenant shows that the landlord failed to timely pro-
vide a refund of the security deposit or an accounting.136 In order to rebut
125. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 93.001 (West 2014).
126. Id. at 688.
127. FP Stores, 512 S.W.3d at 686.
128. Id.
129. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 93.001 (West 2014).
130. FP Stores, 512 S.W.3d at 692.
131. Id. at 687.
132. Id. at 689.
133. Id. at 695.
134. Id. at 691.
135. Id. at 693 (citing Johnson v. Waters at Elm Creek, 416 S.W.3d 42, 47 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 2013, pet. denied)) (emphasis added).
136. FP Stores, 512 S.W.3d at 693 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 93.011(d) (West
2014)).
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this presumption of bad faith, the landlord must “present more than a
scintilla of evidence that it acted in good faith.”137 The Landlord in the
FP Stores case had presented some evidence to the trial court that the
failure to return the security deposit was a mere accident that was the
result of some management changes.138 The court felt that this evidence
was sufficient to possibly overcome the presumption of bad faith, and,
because there were issues of fact to be decided, it held that summary
judgment was inappropriate.139 The court reversed the trial courts sum-
mary judgment finding for the tenant and the court remanded the case
for additional proceedings.140
Although Garden Ridge L.P. v. Clear Lake, L.P.141 is generally proce-
dural in nature, there were a few interesting legal nuggets in this case that
serve as useful reminders to practitioners. The issue in this case was a
dispute between a landlord and a tenant over monthly management fees
being included in common area maintenance (CAM).142 The first impor-
tant reminder that came out of this case is that leases are generally
treated “as installment contracts and the statute of limitations begins to
run for separate breach of contract claims on each monthly payment.”143
In this case, the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals extended this
principle to other periodic payments due under a lease, such as payments
of monthly operating expenses.144 The tenant had unsuccessfully tried to
argue that the statute of limitations began to run at a later date, such as
the date that the yearly reconciliation of CAM occurred, and the discrep-
ancy was “discovered.”145
Another interesting practice pointer for the practitioner arising out of
Garden Ridge, was the fairly predictable holding in which the court in
Garden Ridge strictly interpreted the multiple provisions of the lease that
provided for interest on past due payments from the tenant to the land-
lord.146 The tenant had attempted to use these provisions to claim they
were owed interest on past due payments form the landlord.147 Unfortu-
nately, the tenant had not specifically negotiated a provision requiring
interest payments to accrue on past due payments and the court refused
to extend the benefit of the landlord’s negotiated provisions to the ten-
ant.148 Therefore, although it may seem self-evident to most, any practi-
tioner representing tenants must ensure that they specifically contract for
137. Id. at 695 (citing Buck v. Palmer, 381 S.W.3d 525, 527 (Tex. 2012)).
138. Id. at 687.
139. Id. at 695.
140. Id.
141. 504 S.W.3d 428 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.).
142. Id. at 439.
143. Id. at 446; see Discovery Grp., Inc. v. Kammen, No 01-15-002430CV, 2015 WL
7300690, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 19, 2015, pet. denied) (mem op.).
144. Id. at 447.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 450.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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the right past due payments to the tenant to accrue interest.149
B. WAIVER OF NONWAIVER CLAUSES
In what the authors feel is one of the most frustrating cases decided
during the Survey period, in Shields Limited Partnership v. Bradberry,150
the Texas Supreme Court stepped in to try to clarify what it felt was in-
consistent handling of non-waiver provisions by the lower courts. Unfor-
tunately, instead of clarifying matters for practitioners, the decision in
this case only muddies the waters more.151 The facts in the case are de-
ceptively simple: the tenant claims to have exercised an option to extend
the lease through May 31, 2017, and the landlord claims the tenant is a
holdover tenant.152 The lease in question contained two five year exten-
sion periods, with the last running from June 1, 2012, to Mary 31, 2017.153
The terms of the extensions were dependent upon the tenant having “ful-
filled all terms and conditions of the lease.”154 The lease also contained
the following relevant provisions:
• the rent was due each month “without . . . prior demand” on the
first day of each month;155
• failure to pay rent by the tenth day of the month is “an event of
default” under the lease”;156
• “Landlord’s failure to enforce any provision of this Lease or its
acceptance if late installments of Rent shall not be a waiver . . .
”;157
• all waivers had to be in a writing signed by the waiving party; and
• forbearance of enforcement would not constitute a waiver.158
Throughout the term of the lease, the tenant frequently paid the rent
late and the landlord frequently accepted such late payments.159 The
landlord eventually instituted eviction proceedings and surprisingly lost
at both the justice court and appeals court level on the ground that the
acceptance of the late payments acted as a waiver to the requirement in
the lease to timely pay rent.160 The landlord appealed to the supreme
court arguing that a non-waiver provision may not be waived by engaging
in the very act the contract disclaims as constituting waiver.161 The tenant
contended that the landlord’s conduct in accepting late rental payments
waived the contractual non-waiver clause.162 The tenant further argued
149. Id. at 451.
150. 526 S.W.3d 471 (Tex. 2017).
151. Id. at 479.







159. Id. at 476.
160. Id. at 477.
161. Id. at 478.
162. Id. at 481.
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that non-waiver provisions are “wholly ineffective” and can be waived to
the same extent as any other contractual provision.163
The supreme court overturned the lower courts and found that “as a
matter of law, accepting late rental payments does not waive the non-
waiver provision in the underlying lease.”164 In making its decision the
supreme court relied heavily on “Texas’s public policy that strongly favors
freedom of contract.”165 The supreme court stated that “[g]iven Texas’s
strong public policy favoring freedom of contract, there can be no doubt
that, as a general proposition, non-waiver provisions are binding and en-
forceable.”166 In the Shields case, however, the issue was not whether a
“non-waiver is enforceable, but whether that clause is waivable and, if so,
the circumstances under which waiver may occur.”167 As the supreme
court explained in some detail, individuals have the right of self-determi-
nation and the idea that a competent adult should have the right to aban-
don a legal right.168 The conundrum faced by the supreme court was how
to determine if a party had intended to abandon a legal right?
In the case at hand, the non-waiver provision specifically stated that
the acceptance of late rent would not be waiver and the court held it had,
in fact, not been waived.169 As a result, the supreme court held that “en-
gaging in the very conduct disclaimed as a basis for waiver is insufficient
as a matter of law to nullify the non-waiver provision in the parties’ lease
agreement.”170 However, the supreme court complicated matters and cre-
ated a mess for practitioners by also agreeing with the tenant, saying
“[w]e agree that a non-waiver provision absolutely barring waiver in the
most general terms might be wholly ineffective.”171
Unfortunately, the Texas Supreme Court’s holding in the Shields case,
along with its statement that a general non-waiver clause “might be
wholly ineffective,” gives the practitioner very little guidance on how to
craft an effective non-waiver clause. The holding effectively puts the non-
waiver clause in the same grey area as pornography—with the guidance
from the supreme court effectively boiling down to “we will know it when
we see it.”172 Given this guidance from the supreme court, the cautious
practitioner would be well advised to carefully and exhaustively examine
each non-waiver clause and to attempt to specifically account for and
enumerate all of the various iterations of behavior which they do not in-
tent to result in waiver of a non-waiver clause. A task that is not only
herculean in nature but clearly much easier said than done.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 480.
165. Id. at 481 (citing Gym-N-I Playgrounds v. Snider, 220 S.W.3d 905, 912 (Tex. 2007)).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 482.
168. Id. at 481.
169. Id. at 484.
170. Id. at 485.
171. Id. at 484.
172. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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In fact, the sad reality is that such a task is realistically impossible to
accomplish. Despite creative lawyers’ best efforts, there is only ever one
truly predictable outcome: humans are always more creative and unpre-
dictable than even the most creative lawyer can foresee. This end result
leaves practitioners attempting to draft effective non-waiver clauses
floundering. The only option left to them is to draft extremely long and
extensive non-waiver clauses with recitals to every imaginable activity
that will not give rise to waiver. But one foregone conclusion looms over
these drafters: someone will, without a doubt, still engage in behavior
that the practitioner never anticipated and the well-crafted and thought-
ful non-waiver provision will be, once again, rendered wholly ineffective.
C. JURISDICTION OF THE JUSTICE COURTS
As in previous years, we continue to see cases challenging the exclusive
jurisdiction of the justice courts to hear cases regarding the right to pos-
session.173 In Midway CC Venture I, LP v. O&V Venture, LLC,174 the
landlord and tenant had been parties to a lease agreement since 2010.175
In 2015, the parties mutually amended the lease so that the tenant could
move into temporary space while the original space was converted to a
wine bar.176 After a series of permit delays, the tenant ultimately moved
back into the original space in August 2016.177 The landlord and tenant
had a disagreement over the amount of rent credit the tenant should re-
ceive and the landlord ultimately notified the tenant on December 27,
2016, that they were in default and that the landlord was terminating the
lease.178 The tenant filed an action in a Harris County district court seek-
ing a declaratory action that it was entitled to certain credits and it was
not in default under the Lease.179 The tenant also sought a temporary
injunction, which was granted, preventing the landlord from “filing any
action seeking to disposes [Tenant] of it right to access and conduct busi-
ness at the [premises].”180 The landlord filed an interlocutory appeal over
the trial court’s abuse of discretion.181
Finding that the district court abused its discretion, the First Houston
Court of Appeals relied on the Supreme Court of Texas’s holding in
McGlothlin v. Kliebert.182 In McGlothlin, the supreme court held that “an
injunction will not be granted where there is a plain and adequate remedy
at law.”183 The court of appeals unequivocally stated that “[i]n Texas, the
173. Midway CC Venture I, LP v. O&V Venture, LLC, 527 S.W.3d 531 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.).
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182. 672 S.W.2d 231, 232 (Tex. 1984).
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method for determining the right to possession of real property, if there is
no unlawful entry, is the action of forcible detainer.184 Jurisdiction to hear
forcible detainer is expressly given to the justice court of the precinct
where the property is currently located.”185
The court held that because the tenant in this case had a clear remedy
at law, there was nothing preventing the justice court from hearing the
tenant’s rent claims and determining the final outcome and, therefore,
the trial court erred in granting the injunction.186
V. PURCHASER/SELLER
A. CONTRACTUAL INTERPRETATION/AMBIGUITY
In Harkins v. North Shore Energy, L.L.C.,187 the Texas Supreme Court,
without hearing oral argument, overturned the trial court and the Corpus
Christi Court of Appeals, and, once again, in what the authors feel is a
recurring theme throughout the last several Survey periods, schooled
practitioners on the law of ambiguity and contractual interpretation.188
The Harkins case was about a complex and long running dispute between
a landowner and a well operator in which the landowner argued that an
oil well drilled by the operator trespassed on the landowner’s property.189
The crux of the case involved construction of legal descriptions attached
to an option agreement for oil and gas leases.190 The option agreement
had been drafted by the operator.191 The description in question stated
“[b]eing 1,210.8224 acres of land, more or less, out of the 1,673.69 acres
out of the Caleb Bennett Survey, A-5, Goliad County, Texas and being
the same land described in the [Export Lease].”192 The land description
in the Export Lease stated “being all of the 1,673.69 acre tract . . . SAVE
AND EXCEPT a 400.15 acre tract described in the [Haman Lease].”193
The oil well operator interpreted the option agreement to give them the
right to select up to 1,210.8224 acres out of the entire 1,673.69 acres and
argued that the option agreement was ambiguous because there was a
slight acreage discrepancy (the Export Lease described a 1,273.54 acre
tract and not a 1,210.8224 acre tract).194 The landowner argued that the
property description was clear and specifically excluded the approxi-
mately 400.15 acres where the operator had drilled an extremely lucrative
184. Midway CC, 527 S.W.3d at 535 (citing TMC Med., Ltd. v. Lasaters French Quarter
P’Ship, 880 S.W.2d 789, 790 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1993, writ dism’d w.o.j.)).
185. Id. (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.004 (West 2014)).
186. Id.
187. 501 S.W.3d 598 (Tex. 2016).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 600.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 603.
193. Id. at 604.
194. Id. at 602.
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the well.195 The trial court held for the operator on summary judgment.196
The appeals court reversed and remanded, holding that the description
was ambiguous and, therefore, a question of fact for a jury which made
summary judgment inappropriate.197 The case wound its way up and
down through the Texas court system for six years before finally being
settled in October 2016 by the Texas Supreme Court.
The supreme court ultimately held that the option agreement was not
ambiguous and in doing so relied on various cases where the court has
previously held that a contract is not ambiguous if “the contract’s lan-
guage can be given a certain or definite meaning.”198 The supreme court
stated that merely because parties argue that certain language has a dif-
ferent meaning does not, in and of itself, make language ambiguous.199 A
contract is only ambiguous if both interpretations given to specific lan-
guage are reasonable.200 The supreme court found that, in order to accept
the operator’s argument that the description was ambiguous, one would
be required to ignore the “plain and express wording of the Option
Agreement” which clearly excluded the 400.15 acres.201 In contrast, be-
cause the description attached to the Option Agreement included the
phrase “more or less,” the two slightly different acreages contained in the
property descriptions could be harmonized which prevented the descrip-
tions from being ambiguous.202 The supreme court held that because
there was “only one reasonable interpretation of the Option Agreement,
the Option Agreement is not ambiguous.”203
Greer v. Shook204 also dealt with construction of an instrument that
some argued was ambiguous. Greer dealt with conflicting interpretations
of a 1927 instrument from Lynn Eddins to John Bordon whereby Eddins
granted Borden a series of interests that appear upon first impression to
be contradictory.205 The case is an important read for any practitioner
faced with interpreting old mineral deeds because the El Paso Court of
Appeals helpfully lays out the rules of construction and engages in a
lengthy analysis to guide the practitioner faced with a similar dilemma.
However, in order to begin to understand the court’s analysis, we must
first lay out the various grants in some detail:
(1) In paragraph 1 of the instrument, “an undivided one sixteenth (1/
16) interest in and to all of the oil, gas and other minerals [which]
may be produced . . . .”206
195. Id. at 603.
196. Id. at 600.
197. Id. at 602.
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204. 503 S.W.3d 571 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, pet. denied).
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(2) In paragraph 4 of the instrument, it stated “[b]e it expressly under-
stood between the parties that the vendor is the owner of all of the
royalty and that the grantee is purchasing one half (1/2) of the roy-
alty [ ] one half (1/2) of the minerals, produced in and from wells or
other operations . . . .”207
(3) In paragraph 5, the instrument went on to provide that “[s]aid land
being now under an oil and gas lease executed in favor of John
Ross, . . . this sale is made subject to the terms of said lease, but
covers and includes one half (1/2) of all the oil royalty . . .”208
Under the terms of the lease referred to in paragraph 5, Eddins
retained a 1/8 royalty interest in the production.209
(4) Finally, in paragraph 6, the instrument provided that in the “event
the above described lease for any reason becomes cancelled or for-
feited, than and in that event an undivided one sixteenth (1/16) of
the lease interest and all future rentals on said land . . . shall be
owned by said Grantee, he owning one sixteenth of all oil, gas and
other minerals in and under said lands . . . .”210
At some point the original lease expired and Eddins’s successors en-
tered into a new lease with Patriot Resources, Inc. with an average roy-
alty of approximately 1/4.211 In 2013, Patriot determined the deed was
ambiguous and it was unclear whether Borden’s successors were entitled
to: (1) 1/16 of all production regardless of the size of the royalty interest;
or (2) 1/2 of any royalty interest established pursuant to the terms of a
lease.212 Patriot filed an interpleader to have the court settle the mat-
ter.213 Eventually both the Borden and the Eddins successors filed mo-
tions for partial summary judgment.214 The trial court found that the
successors of John Borden were entitled to a 1/2 mineral interest in any
production.215 The successors of Eddins appealed.216 The El Paso Court
of Appeals affirmed the finding of the trial court.217
As mentioned above, the rules of interpretation along with the histori-
cal color provided by the court make the case helpful reading for any
practitioner faced with a similar interpretation dilemma. The first rule of
construction the appeals court referred to is the “Double Fraction Prob-
lem and the Legacy of the 1/8 Royalty.”218 The court explained, referring
to the Texas Supreme Court’s discussion of the issue in Hysaw v.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 575.
210. Id. at 576.
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Dawkins,219 that historically the royalty in virtually all oil and gas leases
was 1/8.220 Therefore, when granting a portion of their retained interest
parties would tend to either use a double fraction (1/2 of 1/8) or simply
say the “single fraction of 1/16, to express that he was actually giving the
grantee 1/2 of his entire royalty interest.”221 Another related concept is
what the court referred to as the “estate misconception doctrine.”222
Under this doctrine, the court explained that many land owners who
“leased their minerals to an operator [thought] they only retained 1/8 of
the minerals in place, rather than a fee simple determinable with the pos-
sibility of reverter in the entirety of the mineral estate.”223 The court
found that, when applying these two doctrines to the conveyance at issue
in this case, one can easily resolve all of the apparent contradictions and
it was clear that the instrument conveyed a 1/2 mineral interest which
“included a corresponding royalty interest.”224 Furthermore, the court
stated that the arguments put forth by the Borden successors would re-
quire one to ignore all but two sentences of the instrument, which ignores
years of Texas Supreme Court guidance on the interpretation of mineral
instruments.225 As stated by the court, the Texas Supreme Court has re-
peatedly held that a mineral deed must be interpreted in its entirety by
“construing each and every provision in the deed and harmonizing any
apparent conflicts found in the deed as a whole” and without rendering
any provision meaningless.226
In Jackson v. Wildflower Production Co.,227 following a bank foreclo-
sure, two different parties were granted a mineral interest by the same
grantor (the bank) seven days apart.228 The first grant, to Jackson, was “a
Mineral Deed Without Warranty” dated November 23, 1993 and re-
corded on December 3, 1993.229 The second grant, to Wildflower Produc-
tion, was also a “Mineral Deed Without Warranty” dated November 30,
1993 and recorded on December 14, 1993.230 The trial court found that
via the second grant Wildflower “acquired a superior claim of title” by
virtue of being an innocent purchaser for value without actual or con-
structive notice of Jackson’s ownership interest, because the Jackson War-
ranty Deed “was not filed of record when Wildflower purchased the
mineral interest from the grantor.”231 The Amarillo Court of Appeals re-
219. 483 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Tex. 2016).
220. Greer, 503 S.W.3d 579.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. (citing Hysaw, 483 S.W.3d at 10).
224. Id. at 587.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 584 (citing Hysaw, 483 S.W.3d at 13; Stribling v. Millican DPC Partners, L.P.,
458 S.W.3d 17, 20 (Tex. 2015); Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 362 (Tex. 1991); Coker v.
Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1983)).
227. 505 S.W.3d 80 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2016, pet. denied).




2018] Real Property 385
versed the trial court’s decision.232 The case turned on the difference be-
tween the type of title conveyed by a deed versus a quitclaim which
determined whether the second grantee qualified as an innocent pur-
chaser for value without notice.233 According to the appeals court:
[i]f, when taken as a whole, the instrument discloses a purpose to
convey the property itself, and not merely a transfer of the grantor’s
interest, it will be given the effect of a deed, even though it may have
some characteristics of a quitclaim. Conversely, if the instrument,
taken as a whole, indicates the grantor’s intent to merely transfer
whatever interest the grantor may own, it will be treated as a quit-
claim deed.234
Under the Texas recording system, “the grantee under a later deed will
prevail over the grantee in a prior unrecorded deed of the same property,
unless the purchaser had notice of the prior unrecorded conveyance.”235
However, a very important, and little understood caveat, to this general
rule is that a “party receiving a quitclaim deed to land cannot avail him-
self of the defense of innocent purchaser for value without notice.”236
Essentially, the courts in Texas feel that the very essence of quitclaim
deed “conveys upon its face doubts about the grantor’s interest and a
buyer is necessarily put on notice as to those doubts.”237 The recipient of
a quitclaim deed is “deemed to be on notice of all legal or equitable
claims, recorded or unrecorded, existing in favor of a third party at the
time the quitclaim deed was delivered” and takes the property subject to
those adverse legal claims.238 The appeals court goes on to discuss what
makes a document a quitclaim and takes great pains to clarify that the
mere use of quitclaim words, such as “all of my right, title and interest, is
not the litmus test for determining whether a particular instrument is a
quitclaim.”239
Wildflower argued that the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Bryan v.
Thomas,240 where Justice Culver stated “[t]o remove the question from
speculation and doubt we now hold that the grantee in a deed which pur-
ports to convey all of the grantor’s undivided interest in a particular tract
of land, if otherwise entitled, will be accorded the protection of a bona fide
purchaser” supported their argument that the instrument was a deed and
232. Id. at 95.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 90.
235. Id. (emphasis added); see Houston Oil Co. v. Kimball, 122 S.W. 533, 536 (Tex.
1909); Diversified, Inc. v. Hall, 23 S.W.3d 403, 406 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 20000,
pet. denied); see also Gibraltar Sav. Ass’n v. Martin, 784 S.W.2d 555, 557 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 1990, writ denied).
236. Jackson, 505 S.W.3d at 91; see Richardson v. Levi, 3 S.W. 444, 446 (1887); see also
Cook v. Smith, 74 S.W. 1094, 1095–96 (Tex. 1915).
237. Jackson, 505 S.W.3d at 91 (citing South Plains Switching Ltd. v. BNSF Ry. Co., 255
S.W.3d 690, at 707 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, pet. denied)).
238. Id. (citing Woodward v. Ortiz, 237 S.W.2d 286, 291–92 (1951); Tate v. Kramer, 23
S.W. 255, 257 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1892, no writ)).
239. Id. at 93.
240. 365 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. 1963).
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not a quitclaim.241 The appeals court distinguished the holding in Bryan
by explaining that: (1) the deed in Bryan contained a warranty clause;
and (2) to be a quitclaim an instrument must have other indicators of the
grantor’s intent, such as “the absence of a covenant of seisin or a war-
ranty of title.”242 The appeals court concluded that the Wildflower Deed
was a quitclaim because it (1) conveyed only the “grantor’s right, title,
interest, and estate”; (2) contained no covenant of seisin; (3) included no
warranty of title; and (4) otherwise “did not express and intent to convey
the property itself.”243
B. PURCHASE AGREEMENTS/OPTION CONTRACTS
In Capcor at Kirby Main, L.L.C. v. Moody Nat’l. Kirby Houston S,
L.L.C.,244 a prospective purchaser of commercial property sued the ven-
dor for breach of the sales contract and the escrow agent for tortious
interference with the contract and breach of fiduciary duty with respect to
a failed closing.245 The trial court had awarded the seller attorney fees,
the escrowed funds, and contractual liquidated damages and the prospec-
tive purchaser appealed.246 At issue in the case was the title company’s
refusal to accept a cashier’s check delivered after 5:00 pm on the day of
closing when the escrow agent had informed the purchaser’s lawyer the
day before the transaction, and the purchaser on the morning of the clos-
ing, that a wire would be required.247 The contract at issue was the stan-
dard Texas “Unimproved Property contract” promulgated by the Texas
Real Estate Commission.248 The contract contained a specific closing date
and stated “[a]t closing . . . Buyer shall pay the Sales Price in good funds
acceptable to the escrow agent.”249 The contract went on to provide that
failure to close on the closing date entitled the other party “to exercise its
contractual remedies, which included terminating the contract and receiv-
ing the earnest money as liquidated damages.”250 Although the Texas Ti-
tle Manuel considers a cashier’s check to be a form of good funds,251
Fidelity National Title had a policy not to accept cashier’s checks because
of the increase in the number of fraudulent checks.252 Furthermore, cash-
ier’s checks are subject to a three day recall, which meant that the trans-
action could not close and fund the day the agent received the check.253
The day after the scheduled closing, the purchaser offered to send a wire
241. Jackson, 505 S.W.3d at 92 (quoting Bryan v. Thomas, 365 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. 1963)).
242. Id.
243. Id. at 95.
244. 509 S.W.3d 379 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.).
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251. Id. at 388; see 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 9.1 (2013) (Tex. Dep’t of Insurance, Basic
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but the seller refused and instead cancelled the contract.254 The purchaser
sued.255 In addition to the arguments against the agent, the purchaser
claimed that failure to deliver good funds on the day of closing was not a
material breach.256
The First Houston Court of Appeals began their analysis by reiterating
the well accepted legal premise that a material breach of a contract by
one party excuses the other from performance.257 The court went on to
explain that although time is not “ordinarily of the essence,”258 “[t]imely
performance” may be a material term if “it is clear the parties intend that
time be of essence.”259 In order for “time to be of the essence” in a con-
tract, a contract must either (1) explicitly state that time is of the essence;
or (2) there must be something about the deal that makes it apparent to
the parties that time is of the essence.260 If a party has the right to cancel
a contract that is not consummated at a certain date and time, the courts
generally interpret the right to cancel for failure to perform as an indica-
tor that time was of the essence.261 In this case, the terms of the contract
clearly allowed the seller to terminate the contract and retain the earnest
money if the purchaser failed to deliver good funds acceptable to the es-
crow agent by the closing date.262 Therefore, the court of appeals found
that time was of the essence to the transaction and reaffirmed the trial
courts holding.263
Although Tregellas v. Carol M. Archer Trust No. Three264 is at its core
a mineral interest case, the authors think most transactional practitioners
will find the Amarillo Court of Appeals holding highly troubling because
the holding has far-reaching impacts for all real estate transactions and
effectively renders any option to purchase real property essentially
worthless. The Tregellas case concerns a right of first refusal with respect
to a mineral interest.265 In June 2003, a warranty deed transferred the
surface of certain property located in Hansford, County Texas to the
Archer Trustees.266 In a separate agreement, entered into simultaneously,
the Archer Trustees were granted a “Right of First Refusal” (ROFR) to
purchase the minerals under the surface they had already purchased.267
The ROFR specifically provided that it was subordinate to mortgages and
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 389.
257. Id. at 390.
258. Id. (citing Kennedy Ship and Repair, L.P. v. Pham, 210 S.W.3d 11, 19 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.)).
259. Id. (citing Mustang Pipeline Co. v. Driver Pipeline Co., 134 S.W.3d 195, 196 (Tex.
2004) (per curium)).
260. Id. at 390 (citing Kennedy, 210 S.W.3d at 19).
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 391 (citing Cooker v. Cooker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1983)).
264. 507 S.W.3d 423 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2016, pet. granted).
265. Id. at 426.
266. Id.
267. Id.
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other encumbrances.268 Unfortunately, although the property description
in the ROFR was correct, it contained the incorrect county, listing the
county as Ochiltree instead of Hansford.269 The Archer Trustee’s attor-
ney prepared a correction and sent it to the grantors for signature but
only two of the many grantors (the Tidwells) signed and returned the
correction.270 The correction was filed of record in Hansford County in
September 2004.271 Two of the original grantors of the ROFR (the
Farbers) sold their mineral interests on March 28, 2007 to Tregellas.272
The Archer Trustees became aware of the sale in May 2011 and filed suit
for specific performance of the ROFR on May 5, 2011.273
To further complicate matters, in 2008, another set of heirs of one of
the original grantors of the ROFR (the Smiths) also sold their interest to
Tregellas.274 After they learned of the Archer Trustee suit, the Smith
transaction was restructured into a loan secured by a deed of trust with a
note payable in ninety days.275 No payments were ever made on the note
by the Smiths and, in August 2012, Tregellas acquired the Smith interest
at a non-judicial foreclosure sale.276
Upon finding out about the foreclosure transaction, the Archer Trust-
ees amended their petition and alleged that Tregellas “obtained the Smith
minerals by subterfuge, artifice, or device.”277 The trial court granted spe-
cific performance to the Archer Trustees with respect to both the Farber
and Smith ROFR interest.278
Tregellas appealed and argued, among other issues, that the correction
instrument did not comply with the requirements of the Texas Property
Code, which allows individuals with personal knowledge of facts to pre-
pare and execute an instrument that effect non-material corrections that
result from clerical error.279 The correction of a county name is included
in the list of non-material corrections permitted to be made.280 Tregellas
argues the correction instrument did not substantially comply with the
requirements of Section 5.028 because: (1) the instrument does not state
the basis for the Tidwells’ personal knowledge; (2) a signed copy was not
sent to the Farbers or the Smiths; and (3) a copy was not filed in the
original incorrect county (Ochiltree) but instead was filed only in Hans-
ford County.281 Although the instrument did not state the basis for the
Tidwells’ knowledge, the court found that because the Tidwells were








276. Id. at 427–28.
277. Id. at 428.
278. Id.
279. TEX. PROP. CODE § 5.028 (West 2014).
280. Tregellas, 507 S.W.3d 428.
281. Id.
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among the list of grantors one could infer their personal knowledge and
that the instrument, therefore, substantially complied with the personal
knowledge element of Section 5.028.282
The court also found substantial compliance with the notice require-
ment because the Archer Trustees had sent the unsigned notice to all of
the Grantors.283 Finally the court found that the correction complied with
the recording requirements.284 Although a literal reading of Section
5.028(d)(1) requires the correction to be filed in all counties where the
original was filed, because the correction contained the recording infor-
mation for the original document, the court found substantial
compliance.285
The next argument put forth by Tregellas was that the Archer Trustees’
claim for specific performance, with respect to the Farbers’ interest, was
barred by the statute of limitations.286 Generally, when a grantor of a
ROFR sells property in breach of a ROFR “there is created in the holder
an enforceable option to acquire the property according to the terms of
the sale.”287 However, Section 16.004(a)(1) of the Texas Civil Practices
and Remedies Code requires “a suit for specific performance of a con-
tract for conveyance of real property to be brought no later than four
years after the cause of action accrues.”288 The appeals court held that
the breach occurred on March 28, 2007, when the Farbers sold their prop-
erty to Tregellas and that the suit for specific performance was barred
because it was filed outside the four year statute of limitations period.
The appeals court relied on the Texas Supreme Court’s holding in S.V. v.
R.V.,289 where the supreme court stated “a cause of action accrues when
a wrongful act causes some legal injury, even if the fact of injury is not
discovered until later, and even if all resulting damages have not yet
occurred.”290
The Archer Trustees tried, unsuccessfully, to argue that with respect to
rights of first refusal the right is “dormant” until the holder is notified of
a potential sale.291 The appeals court disagreed and said that supporting
the Archer Trustees’ argument would result in profound uncertainty that
was “inconsistent with the purpose of the statutes of limitation,”292 which
282. Id. at 429 (citing Santos v. Guerra, 570 S.W.2d 437, 440 (Tex. Civ. App.—San
Antonio 1978, writ ref’d n.r.e.)).
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.; see TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.028 (West 2014). Substantial compliance was all
that was required for documents recorded prior to September 1, 2011, when the law was
revised. The law was further revised in 2013. See Act of May 24, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch.
158, § 1, 2013 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 158.
286. Tregellas, 507 S.W.3d at 429.
287. Id. at 430 (citing A.G.E., Inc. v. Buford, 105 S.W.3d 667, 673 (Tex. App.—Austin
2003, pet. denied)).
288. Id. at 430 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.004(a)(1) (West 2002)).
289. 933 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tex. 1996).
290. Tregellas, 507 S.W.3d at 431 (quoting S.V., 933 S.W.2d at 4).
291. Id.
292. Id.
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according to the supreme court’s holding in S.V. is to “establish a point of
repose and to terminate stale claims.”293
The Archer Trustees then try to argue for application of the discovery
rule which tolls the accrual of a cause of action until the party learns of
the injury or, through reasonable due diligence, could have learned of the
injury.294 The court dismissed the Archers Trustees’ arguments and relied
on the Texas Supreme Court’s holding in Cosgrove v. Cade,295 which lim-
its application of the discovery rule to injuries that are “inherently undis-
coverable”296 and not ones that are discoverable by the exercise of
“reasonable due diligence” such as a search of public records.297 Further-
more, the appeals court emphasized that the Texas Supreme Court has
specifically held that there are only rare instances where the discovery
rule should be applied to breach of contract cases as each party to a con-
tract is required to protect their own interests and “diligent contracting
parties should generally discover any breach during a relatively long four-
year limitations period.”298
In response, the Archer Trustees argued that it is well settled in Texas
that “owners of property are under no duty [to] routinely . . . search the
deed records for later-filed documents impugning their title.”299 The ap-
peals court distinguished the case at hand because the Archer Trustees
did not own an interest in land; they only owned an option to acquire a
mineral interest, which is only a contract right.300 The appeals court re-
versed the trial court with respect to the Farbers’ interest and upheld the
trial court with respect to the Smiths’ interest.301
A petition has been granted with the supreme court. Given the sub-
stantial uncertainty this holding creates for a very common transactional
practice, rendering it virtually useless, the author hopes that the supreme
court will clear up the issue.
The McCarthy v. Realty Austin, LLC302 case dealt with the definition
of “procuring cause” regarding a real estate broker who claimed to be
entitled to a commission for a real estate purchase that was arranged by a
different real estate broker.303 In this case, a real estate broker assisted a
client with leasing a property on Lake Austin.304 After leasing the prop-
erty, the client later decided to buy the property and worked with another
broker.305 The original broker sued the client for the brokerage commis-
293. Id. at 432 (quoting S.V., 933 S.W.2d at 3).
294. Id. at 432 (citing Cosgrove v. Cade, 468 S.W.3d 32, 36 (Tex. 2015)).
295. 468 S.W.3d 32, 36 (Tex. 2015).
296. Tregellas, 507 S.W.3d at 432 (citing Cosgrove, 468 S.W.3d at 36).
297. Id. (citing Wagner & Brown v. Horwood, 58 S.W.3d 732, 734–35 (Tex. 2001)).
298. Id. (citing Via Net v. TIG Ins. Co., 211 S.W.3d 310, 315 (Tex. 2006)).
299. Id. at 433 (citing Vanderbilt Mortg. & Fin., Inc. v. Flores, 692 F.3d 358, 369 (5th
Cir. 2012)).
300. Id. at 433–34.
301. Id. at 437.
302. 500 S.W.3d 677, 678 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2016, pet. denied).
303. Id. at 678–79.
304. Id. at 678.
305. Id.at 679.
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sion, claiming he was the “procuring cause of the sale.”306 At trial, the
jury agreed that the original broker was the “procuring cause” and
awarded the broker $250,000 for the commission plus attorneys’ fees.307
In overturning the trial court’s holding, the Amarillo Court of Appeals
relied on a 1923 Texas Supreme Court case, Keener v. Cleveland,308 which
held:
that when a real estate broker is instrumental in bringing together
the seller and a purchaser who is acceptable to him, and they con-
summate a sale and purchase of property on terms that are satisfac-
tory to the seller, this constitutes the agent the procuring cause of the
sale, and he is entitled to the commission agreed upon.309
In the case at hand, the evidence clearly established that when the first
broker arranged the lease, the buyer had no intention of buying the prop-
erty.310 In fact, several months after entering into the lease, the buyer
purchased another property on Lake Austin before deciding the house he
had purchased was too small and finally deciding to purchase the house
he was leasing.311 As the court stated, “simply introducing the property in
question to the buyer, without more, is not sufficient to earn the broker-
age commission, rather the broker must produce a buyer who is ready,
willing, and able to buy the property at issue while the contract is in
force.”312
C. STATUTE OF FRAUDS/PARTIAL PERFORMANCE
As in previous years, there has been an increase in cases dealing with
the statute of frauds. In three cases during the Survey period, Zaragoza v.
Jessen,313 Thomas v. Miller,314 and Burrus v. Reyes,315 the courts found
that the partial performance exception to the statute of frauds applied.
In the Zaragoza case, the Jessens entered into negotiations with the
Zaragozas to buy a house for their daughter.316 The testimony presented
at court showed that Mrs. Jessen and Mrs. Zaragoza prepared a docu-
ment outlining the terms of the transaction, which was never signed.317
Under the terms of the unsigned agreement, the Jessens were to: (1) pay
the Zaragozas a down payment of $73,010; and (2) “assume payment of
the first mortgage” with a balance of $33,990.00.318 The Zaragozas were
306. Id. at 680.
307. Id.
308. 250 S.W. 151, 152 (Tex. 1923).
309. Id.
310. McCarthy, 500 S.W.3d at 681.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. 511 S.W.3d 816, 823 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, no pet.).
314. 500 S.W.3d 601, 604 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2016, no pet.).
315. 516 S.W.3d 170, 185 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, pet. denied).
316. Zaragosa, 511 S.W.3d at 819.
317. Id.
318. Id.
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to use the down payment to pay off a second mortgage.319 Once the first
mortgage was paid off, the Zaragozas agreed to deed the property to the
Jessens.320 The Jessens paid the down payment and the Zaragozas turned
over possession on the house on June 18, 2007.321 The Jessens then made
over $9,717.41 in improvements to the house.322 In September 2009, the
Jessens paid the first mortgage in full.323 Not only did the Zaragozas re-
fuse to sign over the deed to the house, but they also failed to pay off the
second mortgage.324 The Jessens sued for breach of contract, and the
Zaragozas claimed that the statute of frauds prevented enforcement be-
cause the contract was never signed.325 The El Paso Court of Appeals
held that “the statute of frauds is subject to a well-recognized exception
under the doctrine of partial performance.”326 “Under this exception,” if
a contract has been partly performed it may be
enforced in equity if denial of enforcement would amount to a vir-
tual fraud in the sense that the party acting in reliance on the con-
tract has suffered a substantial detriment, for which he has no
adequate remedy, and the other party, if permitted to plead the stat-
ute, would reap an unearned benefit.327
The court went on to outline the elements required for a purchaser to
enforce an oral contract based on partial performance: (1) payment; (2)
possession; and (3) improvements or other facts that would create “a
fraud on the purchaser if the contract remained unenforced.”328 The Jes-
sens were clearly able to establish every element of the three prongs laid
out by the court.
In the Miller case, the seller (Thomas) and purchaser (Miller) entered
into an oral agreement whereby Miller agreed to pay the mortgage on
Thomas’s property on the understanding that when the mortgage was
paid off, Miller would own the property.329 The Millers, based on this oral
agreement, moved into the property in question, paid the monthly mort-
gage and property taxes for approximately six years and spent over
$30,000 improving the house.330 After several years, Thomas took the po-
sition that he had leased the property to the Millers and attempted to
evict them.331 Eventually, the Millers moved out and Thomas deeded the







325. Id. at 820.
326. Id. at 823 (citing Carmack v. Beltway Dev. Co., 701 S.W.2d 37, 40 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 1985, no writ)).
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Thomas v. Miller, 500 S.W.3d 601, 603 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2016, no pet.).
330. Id. at 605, 611.
331. Id. at 605.
332. Id. at 606.
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the Texarkana Court of Appeals found that the partial performance ex-
ception to the statute of frauds applied, stating that “the kind of perform-
ance that justifies the exception to the statute of frauds is ‘performance
which alone and without the aid of words of promise is unintelligible or at
least extraordinary unless as an incident of ownership, assured, if not
existing.’”333
In the final case, Burrus,334 the parties disputed whether the arrange-
ment was a lease arrangement or an oral contract for deed. The property
owner, Burrus, a licensed real estate agent for over forty years, con-
tended that she was only leasing the property to the Reyes family.335 The
facts presented at trial established that the Reyes family had lived in a
mobile home on the property for over seventeen years when Burrus sold
the property to a third party.336 During the seventeen year period, the
Reyes family made over $22,000337 in improvements to the property, in-
cluding adding a porch, several rooms, a shed, and a dog kennel.338 Al-
though the Reyes family did not move to the property in question until
1993,339 the facts presented at trial also established that after Burrus
bought a 10.75 acre plot of land in 1988 (which included the property in
question),340 Burrus approached the current residents of the various lots
within the parcel and asked if they wanted to enter into an oral arrange-
ment to purchase the property from her by paying monthly payments to
her until they had paid for the full purchase price.341 This type of
purchase transaction is generally called a contract-for-deed transaction
and is regulated in depth by the Texas Property Code.342 However, Sec-
tion 5.072(a) of the Property Code explicitly requires such executory con-
tracts to be in writing.343
On January 31, 2012, Burrus signed a purchase and sale agreement with
a third party to sell the property where the Reyes family lived.344 Some-
time thereafter, the purchaser hired workers to demolish some of the im-
provements that the Reyes family had installed.345 The Reyes family filed
suit in April 2012.346 The purchaser filed a forcible detainer action against
Reyes and a breach of contract action against Burrus.347 After the trial
court granted a temporary injunction, the purchaser and the Reyes family
333. Id. at 610 (quoting Nat’l Prop. Holdings L.P. v. Westergren, 453 S.W.3d 419, 427
(Tex. 2015)).
334. Burrus v. Reyes, 516 S.W.3d 170 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, pet. denied).
335. Id. at 176–77.
336. Id. at 177–78.
337. Id. at 178.
338. Id. at 177–78.
339. Id. at 177.
340. Id. at 176.
341. Id.
342. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.072(a) (West 2014).
343. Id. (“An executory contract is not enforceable unless the contract is in writing and
signed by the party to be bound . . . .”)
344. Burrus, 516 S.W.3d at 178.
345. Id. at 179.
346. Id.
347. Id.
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entered into a settlement agreement whereby the Reyes family agreed to
move in exchange for $64,000.348 The Reyes’s continued their suit against
Burrus. The jury ruled in the Reyes family’s favor, finding that Burrus
and the Reyes family had an oral agreement which fell within the partial
performance exception to the statute of frauds.349 The jury also found
that because Reyes had entered into two or more executory contracts
within a year, the Reyes’s were entitled to liquidated damages pursuant
to Section 5.077(d)(1) of the Texas Property Code because Reyes failed
to provide the annual statements required by Section 5.077(a).350 Burrus
appealed on the basis that there was insufficient evidence to support the
finding that the partial performance exception applied.351 Burrus argued
that the Reyes family needed to show not just that improvements had
been made to the property, but that “the improvements were substantial
and added materially to the value of the property.”352
Burrus relied on the Texas Supreme Court’s holding in McGinty v.
Hennen,353 in which a homeowner sued a contractor for the cost of re-
pairing the contractor’s poor work that led to water leaks and mold.354 In
McGinty, the homeowner established the expenses related to the repairs,
but failed to establish that the repairs were “reasonable and neces-
sary.”355 The El Paso Court of Appeals distinguished McGinty from the
Burrus case because in order to support their partial performance claim,
Reyes only needed to establish that the repairs were “valuable and per-
manent.”356 Burrus also argued “that the Reyes Family was not entitled
to liquidated damages because the contract was not in writing” as re-
quired by Section 5.072.357 However, the requirement that executory
agreements must be in writing was only added to the Texas Property
Code in 2001, well after the agreement at issue in this case.358
VI. TITLE/CONVEYANCES/RESTRICTIONS
A. CONVEYANCES
The Survey period also included a number of cases construing deed
language. In one case that was reported and questioned last Survey pe-
348. Id.
349. Id. at 180.
350. Id.; see also TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.077(d)(1) (West 2014) (“A seller who con-
ducts two or more transactions within a 12-month period under this section who fails to
comply with Subsection (a) is liable to the purchaser for: (1) liquidated damages in the
amount of $250 a day for each day after January 31 that the seller fails to provide the
purchaser with the statement, but not to exceed the fair market value of the property”). At
trial, the Reyes family introduced evidence that another family had entered into a similar
arrangement with Burrus in May 1994. Burrus, 516 S.W.3d at 195.
351. Id. at 181.
352. Id. at 182.
353. 372 S.W.3d 625, 627–29 (Tex. 2012).
354. Id. at 626.
355. Id.
356. Burrus, 516 S.W.3d at 183.
357. Id. at 195.
358. Id.
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riod, Davis v. Mueller,359 the Texas Supreme Court reversed the Texar-
kana Court of Appeals360 to find a general grant of “all” the property
“owned by Grantor in Harrison County” was sufficient to grant all of the
property owned by the grantor in Harrison County.361 In this case, the
statute of frauds was tested, and the specific granting clause listed ten
vaguely described tracts in Harrison County, but the following paragraph
in the deed included a Mother Hubbard clause indicating that the “Gran-
tor hereby conveys to Grantee all of the mineral, royalty, and overriding
royalty interest owned by Grantor in Harrison County, whether or not
same is herein above correctly described.”362
The grantee of a subsequent conveyance to two of the tracts, also in
Harrison County, brought the trespass-to–try-title case to determine
ownership of those tracts. The supreme court restated Texas law that a
general conveyance of all the grantor’s property in a geographic area will
be given effect.363 The subsequent grantee challenged the deed and
claimed it was ambiguous because the general granting clause was in the
same paragraph as a Mother Hubbard clause. “A Mother Hubbard clause
is not effective to convey a significant property interest not adequately
described . . . .”364 However, the supreme court found meaning in the
general grant, stating “all meant all.”365 The grant of all the property
saved the earlier vague descriptions.
The El Paso Court of Appeals used a similar approach in determining
whether a grant of a right of way was an easement or fee simple in BNSF
Railway Co. v. Chevron Midcontinent, L.P.366 The court specifically used
a “four corners” rule to determine the intent of the parties, rather than
using “arbitrary” construction rules.367 The court made an effort to inter-
pret the deeds so that no clause was rendered meaningless, and found
that the use of the phrase “right of way” did not automatically convey an
easement or a fee simple.368 In BNSF, the determining feature was the
description of the property by referencing a line traced by surveyors that
went over, through, and across various sections of land. Moreover, the
granting language suggested that the conveyance was intended to be an
easement. The court found the following factors to be persuasive:
(1) “The opening recitals of the deed” recognized that the grantor
“would receive valuable benefits if the railroad passed over the
land he was conveying”;
359. 528 S.W.3d 97, 104 (Tex. 2017).
360. Mueller v. Davis, 485 S.W.3d 622, 633 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2016), rev’d, Davis,
528 S.W.3d at 104.
361. Davis, 528 S.W.3d at 102.
362. Mueller, 485 S.W.3d at 629.
363. Davis, 528 S.W.3d at 98.
364. Id. at 102.
365. Id.
366. 528 S.W.3d 124, 125 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, no pet.).
367. Id. at 128.
368. Id. at 128–29.
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(2) “The phrase ‘for a right of way’ appear[ed] in the granting clause
directly in front of the phrase ‘that strip of land.’” This was a defin-
ing phrase limiting the estate being granted;
(3) The conveyance was described by reference to a “line traced by a
surveyor . . . [o]ver, though, and across the land”;
(4) “The deed specifi[ed] that the conveyance c[a]me[ ] . . . with the
right . . . [to take] wood, water, stone, timber and other material”
used for convenience in the “construction and maintenance of [the]
railway.” If the grant was a fee simple estate these would not “need
to be specified”; and
(5) The court found that the use of the term “premises” “suggest[ed]
that a conveyance transfer[red] only an easement.” Interestingly
enough, the term “fee simple” was used in the addendum clause,
but the court found that not determinative.369
The Tyler Court of Appeals also showed the importance of word choice
in Richardson v. Mills370 when it focused on the word “forever” in the
addendum clause and in the warranty.371 The court found that this lan-
guage made a 1906 document a mineral deed and not a lease. It was clear
that it was not intended to grant temporary rights. A subsequent docu-
ment in 1908 sought to release the earlier lease, but it utilized the wrong
year, July 9, 1907, and not July 9, 1906. The court found that the 1908
document, by its liberal terms, released something different, and did not
affect the 1906 deed.372
Particularly in the oil and gas field, practitioners are aware of the
Duhig Rule, an estoppel rule by which the grantor is found to have con-
veyed the greatest estate warranted by deed, whether by estoppel or after
acquired title. In Combest v. Mustang Minerals, LLC,373 the San Antonio
Court of Appeals distinguished the Duhig Rule to find the deed unambig-
uous based upon the “four corners” rule interpretation of the parties’
intent. This follows the current trend in deed interpretation. The court
found that a reservation to the grantors of a one-half fraction of the min-
erals under the entire tract, rather than reserving only one-half of grant-
ors mineral interest, did not convey to the grantee a one-half mineral
interest.374 The deed specifically excepted from the conveyance and war-
ranty and reserved to the grantors, their heirs, and assigns, one-half of all
oil, gas, and other minerals. This exception, together with the limited gen-
eral warranty, did not create an estoppel or a breach of warranty situation
to which the Duhig Rule might apply.375
In another case dealing with deeds, Aguilar v. Sinton,376 the El Paso
369. Id. at 133–34.
370. 514 S.W.3d 406, 414 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2017, pet. denied).
371. Id. at 416.
372. Id. at 416–18
373. 502 S.W.3d 173, 179 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, no pet.).
374. Id. at 180.
375. See Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., 144 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. 1940).
376. 501 S.W.3d 730, 734 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, pet. denied).
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Court of Appeals restated the principle that a deed is not effective unless
delivered. The court went further, noting that mere delivery is not enough
in the absence of acceptance of the conveyance.377 In this case, an at-
tempted special warranty deed purporting to convey a contaminated por-
tion of property back to the former property owners was null and void.
The former owners never agreed to accept a conveyance of the contami-
nated property and, in this case, delivery alone was insufficient.378 Typi-
cally, acceptance questions arise in the context of a deed into a
government entity, but here the same principle applied when a grantor
sought to rid itself of undesirable property by simply deeding it to
another.379
B. TRESPASS-TO-TRY-TITLE
Several cases dealt with nuances of trespass-to try-title during the Sur-
vey period. In Rife v. Kerr,380 the San Antonio Court of Appeals restated
the basic premises of trespass-to-try-title, including the means by which a
plaintiff can prevail. This case involved a common source by which both
parties claimed title from a single individual that held title to the lots as a
trustee. There is a good discussion relating to dry passive trusts, such that
the trustee who was also a beneficiary could only transfer title to a one
one-half interest. This is because a dry or passive trust immediately vests
title in the beneficiaries. Moreover, the parties receiving the deed claimed
adverse possession based on a 1932 deed. The court of appeals found that
there was some evidence of hostility, but noted a significantly high bur-
den to establish adverse possession against a cotenant particularly with
respect to mineral interests.381 Essentially, this case restates the premise
that a cotenant can rarely, if ever, dispossess or adversely possess against
another cotenant.382
C. RESTRICTIONS
In Elbar Investments, Inc., v. Garden Oaks Maintenance Organiza-
tion,383 the restrictive covenants stated “[n]o residence shall be erected
on a lot or homesite of less frontage than seventy-five (75) feet.”384 In
this case, the original residence was built on a single lot having frontage
of seventy-five feet. Subsequently, an owner split the lot in half, resulting
in the two halves of the duplex separately occupying two lots. Each new
lot had a frontage of 371/2 feet. The owner contended that no violation of
the deed restrictions existed because the original residence that was built
377. Id.
378. Id. at 735.
379. Id. at 733.
380. 513 S.W.3d 601, 609–10 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, pet. denied).
381. Id. at 616–17.
382. But see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.0265(c) (West 2002) (adverse
possession by cotenant heirs against each other).
383. 500 S.W.3d 1, 2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied).
384. Id.
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was on a lot that had a frontage of seventy-five feet. He had not con-
structed anything new on the property. The decision turned on the mean-
ing of “erected,” and the First Houston Court of Appeals concluded that
the meaning was clear in this case.385 The subsequent lot division did not
cause a violation of the restrictive covenant.
In Garrett v. Sympson,386 the homeowner filed suit against an owner’s
use of the house for short-term vacation rentals, claiming that such a use
violated the restrictive covenant requiring the lots to be used for single-
family residence purposes. The restrictions also prohibited commercial
use of the lots. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals found that the phrase
“resident purposes” was ambiguous, and had to be construed against the
neighbors who objected to the use of the house for short-term rentals.387
In addition, “commercial purposes” did not specify what activities consti-
tuted commercial purposes.388 Together, the wording of these restrictions
did not prohibit short-term vacation rentals where the vacation renters
used the house for residential purposes, and the receipt of rental income
did not detract or change the residential characteristics of the property.
Tarr v. Timberwood Park Owners Association389 dealt with a similar
situation and, in this case, the restrictive covenant mandated that the sub-
division tracts be “used solely for residential purposes.” The San Antonio
Court of Appeals determined that a residence required a “physical pres-
ence and intention to remain” and that this would prohibit a temporary
occupation without any intention of making that place the person’s
home.390 Such a situation would not be a person’s residence.
There were also some miscellaneous cases in the area of restrictions
worth noting. In Houston Laureate Associates, Ltd., v. Russell,391 the
Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals found that homeowners had
standing and capacity to sue in connection with a recreational purpose
easement. The court noted that standing is when a party is “personally
aggrieved,” whereas capacity addressed the “legal authority to act.”392
With both standing and capacity, the homeowners were able to enforce
the recreational easement and preclude limitations and charges for its use
by an encroaching landowner.393 In another case dealing with easements,
Horse Hollow Generation Tie, LLC v. WhitWorth-Kinsey #2, Ltd., the
Austin Court of Appeals allowed reformation of a wind easement to re-
flect the actual agreement of the parties as to the calculation of payment
385. Id. at 5.
386. 523 S.W.3d 862, 864 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
387. Id. at 868.
388. Id.
389. 510 S.W.3d 725, 729 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, no pet.).
390. Id. at 730 (quoting Manson v Milton, 948 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
1997, writ denied)).
391. 504 S.W.3d 550, 557–58 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.).
392. Id. at 556.
393. Id. at 571.
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for use of the easement.394 Also, a note to those serving on association
boards, the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals in Brown v. Hensley
reaffirmed that the Texas Charitable Immunity and Liability Act pro-
vided immunity and protection from personal liability for acts discharged
within the scope of authority, even if the specific act was wrong or negli-
gent.395 In this case, the suit revolved around claims that the board failed
to repair hurricane and fire damage to the complex, resulting in later
steps to demolish the buildings.
D. LIS PENDENS
A decision by the Texas Supreme Court in a case litigating the effect of
the expungement of a notice of lis pendens led to a legislative remedy:
Texas Property Code Section 12.0071. In Sommers v. Sandcastle Homes,
Inc.,396 a property was sold to a third-party who had actual knowledge of
claims involving a lack of authority by a general partner. The plaintiff
alleged that the earlier transfer of the property was fraudulently made
and outside the general partner’s scope of authority. The defendants ob-
tained an expungement of the notice of lis pendens by convincing the
court that the lawsuit did not involve title, but was rather a monetary
dispute.397 The supreme court held that, regardless of the expungement
or the then existing language of the Texas Property Code, independently
gained knowledge was not eliminated by the expungement and that the
purchasers could not be bona fide purchasers.398
At the time this case was pending before the supreme court, the Texas
Legislature undertook a review of the lis pendens statute, recognizing the
uncertain results and ineffectiveness of an expungement in the context of
the issue before the court. As noted, the Texas Legislature amended the
Texas Property Code to add Section 12.0071, which gave teeth to an ex-
pungement—making the finding conclusive that the lawsuit did not in-
volve a claim against title to the property. However, the change in the law
was prospective, and did not apply to the Sommers case.
It is hoped that this change will give real meaning to an expungement.
More importantly, it will encourage parties to file a notice of lis pendens,
and potentially put parties that do not file a notice of lis pendens at risk
when there is a claim to real property pending in the litigation. Of course,
the notice of lis pendens is “notice to the world” of the lawsuit itself re-
garding ownership of the property, and when used properly, it is benefi-
cial to provide notice of a true claim to title.399 The courts should be able
to review litigation and identify those lawsuits where a notice of lis
394. Horse Hollow Generation Tie, LLC v. WhitWorth-Kinsey #2, Ltd., 504 S.W.3d
324, 325, 329 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016, no pet.).
395. Brown v. Hensley, 515 S.W.3d 442, 448–49 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017,
no pet.).
396. 521 S.W.3d 749, 754 (Tex. 2017).
397. Id. at 752.
398. Id. at 756–57.
399. Id. at 758.
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pendens is inappropriate, thereby potentially tying up property. Under
the Texas Property Code Section 12.0071, the courts now have real au-
thority to expunge a notice of lis pendens and allow the parties to transfer
the property; it does not affect the ongoing lawsuit. The supreme court’s
decision was not unanimous in Sommers; Justice Lehrmann concurred in
part and dissented in part with Justices Willett, Hecht, and Devine joining
in the dissenting opinion. While the dissenting opinion is believed to be
the better analysis of legislative intent to give effect to the existing stat-
ute, it would appear that the amendment to the statute will achieve
clearer results.
E. CORRECTION INSTRUMENTS
Tanya L. McCabe Trust v. Ranger Energy400 construed the relatively
new “correction instruments” statutes.401 The issue addressed was
whether the addition of new property in a corrected deed of trust consti-
tuted a non-material or material correction. Since the facts are complex,
the following is a liberal summary. In 2011, the Trust obtained a convey-
ance of overriding royalty interests of various percentages in various dif-
ferent assignments, some excluding and some including the disputed
McShane Fee and Bruce Lease. However, a correction instrument in No-
vember 2011 included these disputed tracts. The prior owner, Mark III,
obtained all six overriding royalty interests, but excluded the two dis-
puted tracts, from Tomco in 2008. Mark III obtained a mortgage in late
2008 from Peoples Bank, which covered only the six properties, omitting
the McShane and Brice tracts. Ultimately, when these errors were discov-
ered, Tomco and Mark III executed a correction assignment in December
2011, which was after the conveyances to the Trust. Mark III defaulted on
the Peoples Bank loan and entered into a 2012 settlement agreement and
a renewal deed of trust containing only the six properties, omitting
McShane and Brice. However, the error was eventually discovered by
Peoples Bank and a corrected deed of trust (including the McShane and
Brice tracts) was filed by Peoples Bank in January 2013. Thereafter, Mark
III defaulted and Peoples Bank foreclosed under its corrected deed of
trust, claiming that such foreclosure wiped out the Trust’s overriding roy-
alty interests, to which the Trust objected and brought suit.402
At issue was the effect of the various correction instruments on the
state of title concerning the interests of the Trust. The correction instru-
ments statue divides correction instruments into those dealing with non-
material corrections403 and material corrections.404 A nonmaterial
correction includes the correction of “a legal description prepared in con-
nection with the preparation of the original instrument but inadvertently
400. 531 S.W.3d 783 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied), superseding
508 S.W.3d 828.
401. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 5.027, 5.028, 5.029, 5.030 (West 2014).
402. Tanya L. McCabe Trust, 531 S.W.3d at 185–93.
403. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.028 (West 2014).
404. Id. § 5.029.
2018] Real Property 401
omitted from the original instrument.”405 The First Houston Court of Ap-
peals majority concluded the corrected deed of trust was a material cor-
rection since it “add[ed] . . . land to a conveyance that correctly
convey[ed] other land.”406 As to a material correction, the statute re-
quired the corrected instrument to have been executed by each party; in
the subject case, Peoples Bank had independently made the correction,
filed it, and provided a copy and notice to the debtor. Therefore, the
Trust alleged the correction instrument was invalid and not effective since
it did not comply with the statutory requirement for execution of a mate-
rial correction. The court agreed and found the correction instrument
invalid.407
Further, such correction instrument statutes provided that the correc-
tion instrument replaces and is a substitute of the original instrument, and
may be relied upon by a bona fide purchaser. But the correction instru-
ment is subject to the interests of an intervening creditor or subsequent
purchaser for valuable consideration without notice acquired after the
date of the original instrument but prior to the date of the correction
instrument.408 Since the court determined that the correction instrument
was invalid, the correction instrument did not constitute “notice to a sub-
sequent buyer.”409 Consequently, the interests of the Trust was not extin-
guished by the Peoples Bank foreclosure.410
There was a strongly-worded dissenting option by Justice Evelyn
Keyes, who viewed the correction instruments as being nonmaterial as
opposed to material, which is legal analysis this author finds unconvinc-
ing. Justice Keyes’ basic premise is that the addition of the McShane and
Brice properties was immaterial411 and could have been corrected by a
knowledgeable person under the statute (in lieu of both parties signing
the correction deed of trust). This is based on the rationale that because
the original conveyance of the properties contained all eight properties
(including McShane and Brice), the omission of the McShane and Brice
properties in the subsequent mortgages was a clerical error.412 Appar-
ently, the Justice does not consider it feasible that not all of the properties
would be mortgaged. Continuing that reasoning, Justice Keyes thinks the
assignee should have known the deed of trust should have included all of
the property acquired by the assignee (Trust).413 Most real estate practi-
tioners, the author believes, would find this faulty reasoning. By the same
token, Justice Keyes finds that the Trust could not be a bona fide pur-
chaser, since it could not prove it had no notice that it’s overriding royalty
405. Id. § 5.028(a-1)(1).
406. Tanya L. McCabe Trust, 531 S.W.3d at 795 (quoting TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 5.029(a)(1)(C) (West 2014)).
407. Id. at 797–98.
408. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.030(b), (c) (West 2014).
409. Tanya L. McCabe Trust, 531 S.W.3d at 798.
410. Id. at 799.
411. Id. at 801 (Keyes, J., dissenting).
412. Id. at 808–09.
413. Id. at 809.
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interests in McShane and Brice should have been included in the original
deed of trust to Peoples Bank.414 Justice Keys somehow ignored the fact
that record title, as reflected the original deed of trust, did not include
those two properties. As a sole dissent, practitioners can hopefully ignore
such opinion.
VII. HOMESTEAD/HOME EQUITY LENDING
One of the most significant cases during the Survey period arose in the
context of home equity lending. In Wood v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A.,415
the Texas Supreme Court addressed limitations and the issue of forfeiture
in connection with an overcharge fee in connection with a home equity
loan origination. The supreme court determined that the home equity lien
remained “not valid unless and until the loan defect was cured.”416 No
statute of limitations applied to the borrower’s action to quiet title.417
But, the right to forfeiture was not immediately available.418 It was the
subject of a breach of contract claim based on the loan documents.419 The
lender, upon notice, had a right to cure under the Constitution and, upon
the cure, the lien would become valid.420 Essentially, the supreme court
used an extraordinarily literal reading of the Constitution to avoid the
limitations issue while preserving the right of the lender to cure a defect
upon notice. Moreover, the supreme court noted that the lender could
correct a defect even without notice.421 The forfeiture provision in the
Constitution was not a cause of action, but rather a remedy in the context
of the breach of contract. Bottom line (and the primary takeaway from
this case): no statute of limitations applies and the lien remains invalid
until cured. Because the issue of whether or not the borrower did pay
closing fees of more than 3% was not before the supreme court, it was
not addressed in the supreme court’s opinion.
Several cases were caught in a time gap by this decision. In particular,
Kyle v. Strasburger422 reversed the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals in
part, and remanded because the court of appeals originally had deter-
mined that limitations applied to a claim by a spouse that she had been
defrauded by loans initiated by her husband using a power of attorney.
The Texas Supreme Court reversed, indicating that the four-year statute
of limitations did not apply, and again emphasized that forfeiture was not
an independent cause of action.423 The case was remanded to address the
wife’s action to declare the Deed of Trust and Special Warranty Deed
414. Id.
415. 505 S.W.3d 542, 551 (Tex. 2016).
416. Id.
417. Id. at 550.
418. Id. at 544.
419. Id. at 546.
420. Id. at 547.
421. Id. at 549.
422. 522 S.W.3d 461, 467 (Tex. 2017).
423. Id. at 463; see Garofolo v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, 497 S.W.3d 474, 489 (Tex. 2016).
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invalid. The Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals likewise followed
Wood in Morris v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co.424 The court there
noted that limitations did not apply to the claim of a noncompliant lien
and remanded the case back to the trial court.
Separately, in another homestead case, the First Houston Court of Ap-
peals affirmed that an abstract of judgment lien does not attach to home-
stead, even when the property is the subject of a divorce with one spouse
retaining the homestead.425 In Hankins v. Harris, the court noted that, in
the context of the divorce, the property was transferred as part of a mari-
tal property settlement agreement.426 In many cases, this involves the
payment of money as consideration for the conveyance. This is treated as
a sale of the land and the property retains its homestead character. The
court distinguished Laster v. First Huntsville Properties Co.,427 in which a
husband had a future interest in the homestead property awarded to the
wife as part of the divorce agreement. In that case, the vested future in-
terest was not homestead and was an interest that could be freely mort-
gaged or alienated.428 The husband was able to use that interest to secure
a promissory note. Once the default occurred and the lender obtained the
vested future interest, it was subsequently able to partition the residence.
In Hankins, there was no such vested future interest in the homestead,
but rather the spouse received an undivided possessory homestead inter-
est to which a judgment lien would not attach.429
VIII. CONDOMINIUM/OWNER ASSOCIATIONS
A number of cases addressed condominiums, homeowners associa-
tions, and related restrictions. In Yeske v. Piazza Del Arte, Inc.,430 the
homeowner argued that the homeowners association had not filed an as-
sumed name certificate until after it sought to foreclose for unpaid assess-
ments. In that regard, the homeowners association was never properly
incorporated, and Yeske argued that Section 82.101 of the Texas Property
Code required a certificate of incorporation for a homeowners associa-
tion prior to the homeowners association conveying any units. Therefore,
the homeowners association had no authority to collect assessments or
foreclose on his unit. The Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals held that
a technical violation of the Act did not excuse payment of condominium
assessments.431
Note that in Savering v. City of Mansfield,432 lots were reserved to the
424. 528 S.W.3d 187, 190 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.).
425. Hankins v. Harris, 500 S.W.3d 140 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet.
denied).
426. Id.
427. 826 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. 1991).
428. Id. at 131.
429. Hankins, 500 S.W.3d at 147.
430. 513 S.W.3d 652, 667 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.).
431. Id. at 668.
432. 505 S.W.3d 33, 38 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, pet. denied) (en banc).
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homeowners association as part of forming the homeowners association
before the homeowners association entity was created. The Fort Worth
Court of Appeals found that the declaration conveyed the lots to the
homeowners association.433 Essentially, the court found that all of the
activities in connection with the formation of the homeowners association
and the reservation of the lots were contemporaneous and involved the
same individuals.434
However, a word to the wise in connection with formation of home-
owners associations can be found in Western Hills Harbor Owners Associ-
ation v. Baker,435 in which the El Paso Court of Appeals found that
simply filing bylaws, which provided means for amendment of the restric-
tions, was insufficient.436 The association declaration made no reference
to the bylaws, nor was there any evidence that contemporaneous original
bylaws existed. In this case, Chapter 209 of the Texas Property Code con-
trolled, requiring a 67% vote to amend a declaration. The declaration was
ultimately found to create mandatory membership in the association and
a right to make mandatory assessments on all lot owners.437 However, the
association failed to prove that 67% of the voting property members
voted, and thus the increased assessments were inappropriate under the
Texas Property Code.438
IX. CONSTRUCTION AND MECHANICS LIENS
A. CERTIFICATE OF MERIT STATUTE
As in previous years, there were a significant number of cases dealing
with the deceptively simple Certificate of Merit Statute.439 This year, the
Texas Supreme Court apparently decided it was tired of the frequent stat-
utory misinterpretations and accepted two separate cases dealing with in-
terpretation of the Certificate of Merit Statute.440 In addition, in one of
its holdings, it endorsed the First Houston Court of Appeals’ holding in
Gaertner v. Langhoff.441 Collectively, these three cases give practitioners
a tremendous amount of insight into the supreme court’s interpretation
of the Certificate of Merit Statute. One would hope this guidance will cut
down on the abundance of litigation over the statute’s requirements the
Texas court system has seen in recent years.
433. Id. at 44.
434. Id. at 46.
435. 516 S.W.3d 215 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, no pet.).
436. Id. at 221–22.
437. Id. at 225.
438. Id. at 225–26 (The highlighted sentence is not true, the lot owners won, not the
association and the assessments were improper).
439. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §150.002 (West 2011).
440. See Melden & Hunt, Inc. v. East Rio Hondo Water Supply Corp., 520 S.W.3d 887
(Tex. 2017); Levinson Alcoser Assocs., L.P. v. El Pistolon II, Ltd., 513 S.W.3d 487, 489
(Tex. 2017).
441. 509 S.W.3d 392 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet).
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In Gaertner v. Langhoff, an interlocutory appeal, the architect con-
tended that the Certificate of Merit Statute requires that the affiant pro-
viding a certificate of merit must have knowledge in the specific sub-
specialty at issue in the case.442 The trial court found that the record sup-
ported that the affiant was knowledgeable in the same area and that there
was no statutory requirement for the affiant to be knowledgeable in the
specific sub-area.443 The architect appealed.444 The First Houston Court
of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision,445 and the Texas Supreme
Court effectively endorsed the holding by its decision in Melden & Hunt,
Inc. v. East Rio Hondo Water Supply Corp.446
In Levinson Alcoser Associates, L.P. v. El Pistolon II, Ltd.,447 the Texas
Supreme Court attempted to resolve what it felt were inconsistencies in
the interpretation of Chapter 150 of the Civil Practice and Remedies
Code. In this particular case, both the trial court and the Corpus Christi
Court of Appeals felt that the proffered certificate of merit was suffi-
cient.448 The supreme court disagreed, and held that the certificate did
not substantiate that the affiant had the requisite knowledge and reversed
the lower court’s ruling.449 The affidavit at issue stated in part “I am a
professional architect who is registered to practice in the State of Texas,
license number 11655. I have been a registered architect in Texas since
1980, and have an active architecture practice in the State of Texas to-
day.”450 The supreme court stated that the certificate failed to meet the
requirements of Chapter 150 because it did not “describe any familiarity
with, or knowledge of, the defendants’ area of practice.”451 The supreme
court held that the knowledge requirement is a separate element and dis-
tinct from the licensure and active-practice requirements, and that estab-
lishing licensure and active practice alone is not sufficient.452 The
supreme court did note, however, that it is not always required that the
certificate contain the details of the affiant’s knowledge, only that there
must be some way to infer from the record the requisite knowledge.453 In
the case before the court, the record contained no such substantiation.454
In Melden & Hunt, Inc. v. East Rio Hondo Water Supply Corp.,455 also
an interlocutory appeal, the Texas Supreme Court stepped in for the sec-
ond time during this Survey period to try to put to rest what it felt were
ongoing misconceptions about the requirements of the Certificate of
442. Id. at 394.
443. Id.
444. Id.
445. Id. at 398.
446. 520 S.W.3d 887, 890 (Tex. 2017).
447. 513 S.W.3d 487, 490–91 (Tex. 2017).
448. Id. at 490.
449. Id. at 494.
450. Id. at 492.
451. Id. at 493.
452. Id. at 494.
453. Id.
454. Id.
455. 520 S.W.3d 887, 889 (Tex. 2017).
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Merit Statute and perceived inconsistencies in the interpretation pro-
vided by various Texas courts.456
In this case, the contractor, Melden, had moved for dismissal at the
trial court level on the basis that the certificate of merit failed to satisfy
the requirements of Chapter 150 because: (1) the certificate contained
conclusory assertions regarding the professional’s competency to testify;
(2) the professional was not actively engaged in the practice of engineer-
ing; and (3) the certificate did not address every theory of recovery and
provide the “factual basis for each such claim.”457
With respect to the first point, the contractor essentially tried to per-
suade the supreme court that a professional providing a certificate should
undergo the same degree of scrutiny normally reserved for the compe-
tence and admissibility of expert testimony.458 This is a standard that is
not contained in the statute; the only requirement in the statute is that
the affiant “is knowledgeable in the area of practice of the defendant.”459
There is no requirement that the “statements in a certificate of merit
must be competent as evidence” with respect to the qualifications of the
professional.460 The supreme court held that the only requirement is that
a trial court is able to ascertain that the professional possesses the requi-
site knowledge.461
With respect to the second point, the supreme court fully agreed with
the strict statutory approach of the court of appeals, which concluded that
Chapter 150 “neither requires the affiant to explicitly state that he or she
is actively engaged in engineering practice nor imposes requirements or
limitations on how the trial court determines whether the affiant is ac-
tively engaged.”462 The supreme court further agreed that the trial court
had not abused its discretion in determining the engineer was quali-
fied.463 The supreme court also repeatedly distinguished the case at hand
from its finding in Levinson Alcoser where there was nothing in the re-
cord to support a finding by the trial court that the expert had relevant
knowledge or experience.464
With respect to the final point, the court of appeals had held that the
point of the certificate was to simply provide “a basis for the trial court to
determine merely that the plaintiff’s claims are not frivolous and to
thereby conclude that the plaintiff is entitled to proceed in the ordinary
456. Id. at 892 n.3.
457. Id. at 890.
458. Id.
459. Id. at 747 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 150.002(a)(3) (West
2011)).
460. Id. (quoting Charles Durvivage, P.E. v. La Alhambra Condo. Ass’n, No. 13-11-
00324-CV, 2011 WL 6747384, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Dec. 21, 2011, pet.
dism’d) (mem. op)).
461. Id. at 896.
462. Melden & Hunt, Inc. v. E. Rio Hondo Water Supply Corp., 511 S.W.3d 743, 748
(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2015), aff’d, 520 S.W.3d 887 (Tex. 2017).
463. Melden, 520 S.W.3d at 889.
464. Id. at 890.
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course to the next stages of litigation.”465 The court of appeals also held
that the certificate proffered in the present case was sufficient and clearly
met the requirements of the statute.466 The supreme court agreed and
affirmed.467
The supreme court addressed in detail the contractor’s argument that
the “factual-basis requirement obligated [the engineer] to provide factual
support for the elements of each theory or cause of action pled by the
plaintiff.”468 The contractor attempted to argue that the certificate of
merit was similar to the expert report required for health care liability
claims under the Chapter 74 of the Civil Practices and Remedies Code.469
The supreme court examined the plain language of Chapter 150 along
with the historical iterations and disagreed with the contractor’s interpre-
tation.470 The language of Chapter 150 provides that the expert affidavit:
set forth specifically for each theory of recovery for which damages
are sought, the negligence, if any, or other action, error or omission
of the licensed or registered professional in providing the profes-
sional service, including any error or omission in providing advice,
judgment, opinion, or a similar professional skill claimed to exist and
the factual basis for each such claim.471
The supreme court pointed out that the original statute had been
amended three times since it was enacted in 2003 in order to clarify that it
was not limited to professional negligence claims, but to all claims against
professionals.472 The contractor argued that the “factual basis for each
such claim” modified the “each theory of recovery” and required the ex-
pert to address the legal elements for each cause of action.473 The su-
preme court rejected this interpretation and held that the “each theory of
recovery” language was added in an attempt to clarify that the statute did
not just apply to negligence actions.474 The “factual basis of each such
claim” was in the original statute and refers to the “negligence, if any, or
other action, error or omission” and simply requires the expert to include
in the certificate a statement regarding the errors the expert believes oc-
curred with respect to the professional services at issue.475
B. NOTICE OF CLAIMS
El Paso County v. Sunlight Enterprises Co.476 is of particular interest to
465. Melden, 511 S.W.3d at 749 (citing CBM Eng’rs, Inc. v. Tellepsen Builders, L.P., 403
S.W.3d 339, 346 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied)).
466. Melden, 520 S.W.3d at 891.
467. Id.
468. Id. at 892.
469. Id. at 892–93.
470. Id. at 893.
471. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 150.002(b).
472. Melden, 520 S.W.3d at 894.
473. Id. at 893.
474. Id.
475. Id.
476. 504 S.W.3d 922, 924 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, no pet.).
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the construction industry because it interprets Section 16.071(a) of the
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code which “provide[s] that a con-
tract stipulation requiring a claimant to give notice of a claim for damages
as a condition precedent to the right to sue on a contract is not valid
unless it is reasonable, and that a stipulation requiring notification within
less than 90 days is void.”477 Although the language of Section 16.071(a)
has been in its current form since 1891, “no court has specifically ad-
dressed whether Section 16.071(a) applies to the notice-of-claims provi-
sions” which are typically found in construction contracts.478 In this case,
Sunlight Enterprises (Sunlight) entered into a construction contract with
El Paso County (the County).479 The County terminated the contract for
lack of performance. Sunlight sued for breach of contract claiming that it
had incurred costs as a direct result of the County’s actions to delay and/
or hinder Sunlight’s performance under the contract.480 The contract in
question had a clause requiring Sunlight to file any claims regarding addi-
tional compensation within seven days, or they would be deemed
waived.481 Sunlight argued that the deadlines imposed by the contract
were voided by Section 16.071(a), and the trial court issued a partial sum-
mary judgment in favor of Sunlight.482
The El Paso Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and held that
Section 16.071(a) does not apply to the conditions of a contract requiring
notice of requests for extensions of time or additional compensation be-
cause these are not the same as a “claim for damages.”483 The appeals
court reasoned “that Section 16.071(a) must be strictly construed because
it is restrictive and in derogation of the common-law right to freely con-
tract.”484 The appeals court went on to state that despite the fact that
many construction contracts provide broad notice provisions that require
notice as a condition precedent to the right to sue on the contract and are
often times related to conditions that may lead to a claim for damages,
these provisions are not the same as a “notice of a claim for damages.”485
C. RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTION LIABILITY ACT
Although the majority of construction liability cases this year seemed
to center around the Certificate of Merit Statute, in Vision 20/20, Ltd. v.
Cameron Builders Inc.,486 the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals had
the opportunity to address the Residential Construction Liability Act
(RCLA) and provide an important reminder to practitioners not to over-
477. Id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.071(a) (West 2002)).
478. Id. at 927.
479. Id. at 924.
480. Id.
481. Id. at 925.
482. Id. at 925–26.
483. Id. at 926.
484. Id. at 927 (citing Travelers’ Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Scott, 218 S.W. 53, 57
(Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1919, writ ref’d)).
485. Id. at 930.
486. 525 S.W.3d 854, 855 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.).
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look its statutory requirements when dealing with any issues arising from
a residential construction defect.487 In Vision 20/20, a plumbing failure in
a house caused significant damage to the structure, furniture, and per-
sonal possessions.488 After all of the work had been completed to remedi-
ate the damages, the insurance company sent a letter to the contractor
who built the original house, Cameron Builders, demanding repayment of
$207,701.05.489 After Cameron refused payment, Vision 20/20 filed suit,
alleging various causes of action, including negligence, breach of war-
ranty, and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act.490 The
builder claimed that the claims were barred by Section 27.0003(a)(2) of
RCLA, which requires that a claimant be given written notice of a “con-
struction defect” and the opportunity to inspect and repair the damages
prior to repairs being commenced.491 The trial court agreed and granted
the builder’s motion for summary judgment.492 Vision 20/20 appealed on
the basis that RCLA only applied to the opportunity to cure the construc-
tion defect and not to the damage caused by the defect.493 The language
relied on by Vision 20/20 is found in Section 27.001(4) of RCLA, which
defines “construction defect” as “‘a matter concerning the design, con-
struction, or repair of a new residence . . . on which a person has a com-
plaint against a contractor. The term may include . . . any appurtenance,
or the real property on which the residence and appurtenance are affixed
proximately caused by a construction defect.’”494 Vision 20/20 argued
that as a result of the inclusion of the phrase “may include” the inclusion
of physical damage was not mandatory but, instead, discretionary.495
The court of appeals disagreed and thought that such an interpretation
of the statute weighed against the plain language of the statute, which
clearly states that a “complaint against the contractor such as alleged here
‘arises’ from a ‘construction defect’ if it merely ‘concerns’ the construc-
tion of a new residence.”496 Furthermore, the court argued, such an inter-
pretation would be contrary to the purpose of the statute, which was
enacted to “encourage settlement and prevent[ ] the cost of litigation.”497
One gets the feeling that Vision 20/20’s argument on appeal was more a
desperate attempt to salvage what turned out to be a very expensive
oversight than a serious and well-constructed legal position. That being
said, this case presents an excellent reminder for all practitioners not to
487. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 27.001–.007 (West 2014).





493. Id. at 856.
494. Id. at 857 (TEX. PROP. CODE § 27.001(4) (West 2014)).
495. Id.
496. Id. (citing In re Wells, 252 S.W.3d 439, 448 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008,
orig. proceeding)).
497. Id. at 858.
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Housing & Community Services v. Texas Windstorm Insurance Associa-
tion498 involved a claim for wrongful denial of coverage relating to hail
damage to an apartment project. The Lantana Square Apartments was
owned by Housing & Community Services (HCS), and the property was
insured against wind and hail storm events through Texas Windstorm In-
surance Association (TWIA), a quasi-governmental body established to
provide Texas coastal communities with windstorm and hail coverage
pursuant to a special legislative act known as the Texas Windstorm Insur-
ance Association Act.499 The Lantana property sustained damage from a
hailstorm on May 15, 2012. HCS filed a claim under the TWIA policies
on May 28, 2013, thirteen days after the one-year limitation period for
filing claims. In its denial letter, the insurance company advised HCS of a
one-time, 180-day extension for the filing period upon a showing of good
cause presented to the Texas Commissioner of Insurance. HCS filed such
extension request, but was denied and brought suit alleging substantial
compliance with the insurance policy and a showing of no harm to the
insurer for the thirteen-day delinquent filing.
Numerous Texas cases have held that where the insured is not
prejudiced, strict compliance is not required. However, the Corpus
Christi Court of Appeals pointed out the special statutory nature of the
windstorm coverage and the specific legislative act creating it, noting this
was a matter of first impression.500 The court concluded this case was
distinguishable from typical insurance claim cases, considering the special
statutory nature of coverage.501 The statute “set[ ] forth a clear and un-
ambiguous one-year limitation period . . . subject to the 180-day discre-
tionary extension” for good cause; therefore, TWIA was justified in
denying any untimely claims filed, regardless of whether TWIA was
prejudiced by the untimely filing of a claim.502 In so holding, the court
noted the draconian consequences for de minimis deviations, and ex-
pressed disgust, but advised that changes must come from the Texas Leg-
islature.503 Practitioners must be alert to the strict claim filing limitation
when dealing with the statutory insurance.
Triyar Co., LLC v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co.504 involved insur-
ance claims arising from damage caused by Hurricane Ike to two proper-
498. 515 S.W.3d 906, 907–08 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2017, no pet.).
499. Id. at 907; see TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 2210.001 (West 2015).
500. Id. at 908–09.
501. Id. at 909.
502. Id. at 910.
503. Id.
504. 515 S.W.3d 517, 519 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. denied).
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ties: San Jacinto Mall and Greenspoint Mall. The policy applicable to
these claims contained a “replacement cost” provision which was payable
only after repairs had been completed, or, at the election of the insured
under certain circumstances, payment of the “Actual Cash Value,” which
pays the actual cost to repair or replace the property subject to deprecia-
tion but does not require the repair or replacement to have been contem-
plated before payment of insurance proceeds.505 Triyar did not repair and
replace the damaged property (mostly a new roof), so Fireman’s Fund
made payments under the Actual Cash Value computation method.
Based on the jury’s finding as to the San Jacinto Mall property, Fireman’s
Fund made payment on damages of $5,876,420, whereas the Actual Cash
Value damage was only $4,400,000, representing an excess payment of
$1,476,420. Similarly, on the Greenspoint Mall property, Fireman’s Fund
made payment on damages of $2,227,000 and the jury found the Actual
Cash Value damage was $2,200,000, representing an overpayment of
$27,156. Since Triyar failed to comply with the policy requirements for
the actual repair and replacement of the damaged property, the Four-
teenth Houston Court of Appeals limited Triyar’s recovery to the amount
of the Actual Cash Value, which Fireman’s Fund overpaid. Therefore,
Triyar was not entitled to any additional recoveries.506
Triyar also attempted to seek recovery for lost business income, which
the policy covered, and which the jury found was $250,000. One mall was
closed for nine days and the other for fifteen days. The insurance policy
excluded the first eighteen days of business income loss, so there was no
obligation for Fireman’s Fund to pay any business income loss.507 Addi-
tionally, Triyar sought recovery for “temporary repairs” to bring the
property into operational order after Hurricane Ike. Triyar was unsuc-
cessful on this point because the title policy covered only “Extra Ex-
penses” and not “temporary repairs.”508 The evidence submitted at the
trial and the jury responses provided an amount for the Actual Cash
Value loss, but nothing specific as to “Extra Expenses.” Therefore, Triyar
could not recover any additional expenses called “temporary repairs.”509
With the recent storm damage along the coast, practitioners need to be
focused on the details of insurance policies, which may provide
recoveries.
B. WATER
Lone Star Groundwater Conservation District v. City of Conroe510 in-
volved a challenge by large water users (mostly municipal entities)
against rules established by the water district limiting the amount of
groundwater that could be produced. While this case is mostly procedural
505. Id. at 519.
506. Id. at 523–25.
507. Id. at 525.
508. Id. at 526–28.
509. Id. at 528.
510. 515 S.W.3d 406, 409 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2017, no pet.).
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in nature relating to the plea to the jurisdiction based on governmental
immunity, there was an important substantive law aspect relating to the
Texas Water Code. The Beaumont Court of Appeals concluded the rules
made by the district were subject to challenge under Section 36.251 of the
Texas Water Code, which provides, in relevant part, that a person “af-
fected by or dissatisfied with any rule or order made by a district . . . is
entitled to file a suit against the district . . . to challenge the validity of the
law, rule, or order.”511 Consequently, governmental immunity does not
shield the district from a suit based on its rules.512
C. PREMISES LIABILITY
Ineos USA, LLC v. Elmgren513 addressed the gas explosion at a pe-
trochemical plant in Alvin, Texas. The plant was owned by Ineos USA,
and Elmgren worked as a boilermaker for Zachry Industrial, an indepen-
dent contractor providing maintenance services at the plant. At the time
of the accident, Elmgren was replacing two valves on a furnace header.
Before the work began, employees of Ineos and Zachry conducted a
lockout-tagout procedure and a sniff test to determine that there was no
gas in the pipeline upon which Elmgren was working. After the gas explo-
sion occurred, Elmgren brought suit against Ineos and Ineos’ employee,
Pavlovsky, who had conducted the tests. The Texas Supreme Court ana-
lyzed and construed the applicable statutory provisions514 relating to
owner protection from premises liability claims. The statute modified the
common law, which made a property owner responsible for premises lia-
bility for negligence if the owner “knew or reasonably should have known
of the risk or danger.”515 By enacting Chapter 95 of the Texas Civil Prac-
tice and Remedies Code, the Texas Legislature changed the scope of
premises liability of an owner to those conditions or acts which the plain-
tiff can prove that the owner had “actual knowledge of the danger or
condition.”516
The supreme court, affirming its prior decision in Abutahoun v. Dow
Chemical Co.,517 stated that Chapter 95 related to claims based upon the
negligent actions of a premises owner.518 “The statute defines ‘claim’ to
mean ‘a claim for damages caused by negligence,’ and does not distin-
guish ‘between . . . categories of negligence claims.’”519 Further, the su-
preme court noted that claims must arise from the “condition or use of an
improvement to real property,”520 confirming their prior decisions inter-
preting “‘condition’ [to] refer[ ] to premises and ‘use’ [to] refer[ ] to activ-
511. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.251 (West 2017).
512. Lone Star Groundwater Conserv. Dist., 515 S.W.3d at 414.
513. 505 S.W.3d 555, 559 (Tex. 2016).
514. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 95.001–.004 (West 2017).
515. Ineos, 505 S.W.3d at 561.
516. Id.
517. 463 S.W.3d 42, 53 (Tex. 2015).
518. Ineos, 505 S.W.3d at 561.
519. Id. at 562 (quoting Abutahoun, 463 S.W.3d at 48).
520. Id. (quoting Abutahoun, 463 S.W.3d at 48).
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ities.”521 Consequently, the supreme court concluded that Chapter 95
applied both to Elmgren’s premises liability claims as well as to negli-
gence-based claims against the premises owner.522
As an Ineos employee, Pavlovsky attempted to piggyback on the provi-
sions of Chapter 95 relating to premises owners. The supreme court re-
jected this position, noting that nothing in Chapter 95 applied to claims of
a property owner’s employees.523 In doing so, the supreme court con-
cluded that the term “entity” as used in the statute could not be expanded
beyond its common definition (an organization with a separate legal en-
tity apart from its members or owners), and that it would not be ex-
panded, as Pavlovsky suggested, to cover the legal entity and its
employees.524
Furthermore, the supreme court rejected the argument that Chapter 95
related to a premises owner’s agent,525 thereby rejecting the holding in
Fisher v. Lee & Chang P’shp.526 The supreme court noted that Fisher
incorrectly relied upon the Texas Property Code definition of “landlord,”
which included the agent of the landlord, in reaching a determination of
the meaning for Chapter 95. However, Chapter 95 contained no language
applicable to a property owner’s agent.527 Finally, Pavlovsky asserted that
if the employee was not covered under Chapter 95, the legal theory of
respondeat superior would make the property owner liable for acts of the
employee. As to this argument, the supreme court clearly announced that
the protections afforded by Chapter 95 cut off any claims of liability
under the theory of respondeat superior.528
Elmgren asserted that the location of his workplace at the plant repre-
sented a different “improvement” under the definition in Chapter 95. The
plant had numerous furnaces as part of an overall gas processing system,
and Elmgren attempted to divide all of the systems into different “im-
provements” for purposes of Chapter 95. Nevertheless, the supreme court
concluded that the valves upon which Elmgren was working were part of
a single processing system within a single plant, and could not be sepa-
rated for purposes of the statute.529 Finally, Elmgren attempted to define
the dangerous condition to be not the single gas leak causing the explo-
sion, but rather the presence of explosive gases in the plant as a whole.
The supreme court rejected this argument, noting it was not the existence
of explosive gases at the plant that caused the accident, but the specific
gas leak that caused the accident.530
521. Id.
522. Id.
523. Id. at 563–64.
524. Id.
525. Id. at 565–66.
526. 16 S.W.3d 198, 202–03 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied), over-
ruled by Ineos, 505 S.W.3d at 565–66.
527. Ineos, 505 S.W.3d at 565.
528. Id. at 566.
529. Id. at 568.
530. Id. at 569.
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In Lopez v. Ensign U.S. Southern Drilling, LLC,531 a case relying upon
Ineos, the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals held that a well and
drilling rig do not constitute a single improvement to real property.532
Here, a subcontractor’s employee who was doing mud logging services on
the well by means of utilizing a stairway on the drilling rig could not come
within the statutory premises liability provision since the employee’s ser-
vices related to the well and not to the construction repair renovation or
modification of the rig.533
Phillips v. Abraham534 involved a premises liability suit decided under
the Texas Supreme Court opinion in Austin v. Kroger Texas L.P.535 Phil-
lips had leased residential property from Abraham, which contained a
driveway that eventually became in disrepair with loose and broken rocks
in certain portions of the driveway. Phillips stepped on loose rocks and
broke two bones in his foot six months before the current accident where
he stepped on loose rocks, fell, and broke his back. Citing Austin, the
Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals affirmed Abraham’s summary
judgment victory based on having no duty to warn Phillips of the drive-
way’s condition. “[A] landowner owes an invitee a negligence duty to
make safe or warn against any concealed, unreasonably dangerous condi-
tions of which the landowner is, or reasonably should be, aware but the
invitee is not.”536 Therefore, the Austin standard is to either give notice
or make a condition not unreasonably dangerous, but not both.537
There are two exceptions to the general premises liability rule estab-
lished in Austin: (1) “dangerous condition[s] result[ing] from the foresee-
able criminal activity of third parties”; and (2) “unreasonably dangerous
premises” for which the invitee, although aware of, is “incapable of tak-
ing precautions that will adequately reduce the risk.”538 In this case, the
first exception was inapplicable, and the court viewed Phillips’s allegation
of the second exception as being inapplicable since Phillips had no need
to walk on the damaged portion of the driveway to access the house or
parked vehicle or other important portions of the residential property.539
Consequently, because Phillips knew of the dangerous situation and was
not subject to the necessary use exception, Phillips was not entitled to
damages under a premises liability theory.
UDR Texas Properties, Ltd. v. Petrie540 is a premises liability case,
which, for the first time in Texas, addresses the reasonableness for prem-
ises liability with respect to prevention of a criminal act. Petrie arrived at
the Gallery Apartments at 2:00 a.m. for a party thrown by one of his co-
531. 524 S.W.3d 836, 845 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.).
532. Id.
533. Id.
534. 517 S.W.3d 355, 357–58 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.).
535. 465 S.W.3d 193, 203 (Tex. 2015).
536. Phillips, 517 S.W.3d at 360 (citing id.).
537. Id.
538. Id. at 361.
539. Id.
540. 517 S.W.3d 98, 100 (Tex. 2017).
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workers. Petrie parked in a visitor parking lot outside the gated and
fenced apartment community, and was immediately assaulted and robbed
in the parking lot. Petrie brought suit against UDR as the apartment
owner for failure to provide adequate protection against such criminal
acts. The trial court determined that UDR owed no duty to Petrie, but
the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals reversed, holding that there
was sufficient “evidence of the foreseeability of an unreasonable risk of
harm” for violent criminal conduct.541
The Texas Supreme Court determined that the court of appeals incor-
rectly interpreted and applied its decision in Timberwalk Apartments,
Partners, Inc. v. Cain.542 The general rule in Texas on premises liability is
that a property owner has “‘no legal duty to protect persons from third
party criminal acts,’”543 but with an exception for an owner who controls
the premises that such owner “‘does have a duty to use ordinary care to
protect invitees from criminal acts of third parties if [the property owner]
knows, or has reasonable reason to know of, an unreasonable and fore-
seeable risk of harm to the invitee.’”544 Therefore, to impose a duty on
such a property owner, there must be both foreseeability and unreasona-
bleness as a condition to impose a duty.545 At the appellate level, the
court only considered the Timberwalk factors on foreseeability;546 how-
ever, the court of appeals failed to consider whether remedial action by
the property owner was unreasonable under the circumstances. The su-
preme court noted that it had rendered previous decisions on the foresee-
ability factor, but never on the unreasonableness grounds.547 Therefore,
since the Timberwalk factors measured only foreseeability, a determina-
tion of reasonableness or unreasonableness was additionally needed to
determine premises liability for a criminal act.
In addressing the unreasonableness criteria, the supreme court speci-
fied: “[a] risk is unreasonable when the risk of a foreseeable crime out-
weighs the burden placed on property owners—and society at large—to
541. Id.
542. Id. at 101; see 972 S.W.2d 749, 759 (Tex. 1998).
543. UDR Texas Props., 517 S.W.3d at 100 (quoting Walker v. Harris, 924 S.W.2d 375,
377 (Tex. 1996)).
544. Id. (quoting Lefmark Mgmt. Co. v. Old, 946 S.W.2d 52, 53 (Tex. 1997)).
545. Id. at 101.
546. The Timberwalk foreseeability factors are: (1) proximity, being whether any crimi-
nal activity previously occurred on or near the property; (2) recency and frequency, being
how recently and how often prior criminal conduct occurred; (3) similarity, being how simi-
lar the subject criminal conduct was to the prior criminal conduct on the property; and (4)
publicity, being the publicity previously given on prior occurrences which would provide
the landowner knowledge or constructive knowledge as to the existence of the criminal
activity. Timberwalk Apartments, 972 S.W.2d at 757–59.
547. UDR Texas Props., 517 S.W.3d at 102. See Timberwalk, 972 S.W.2d at 759 (since
sexual assault was not foreseeable, unreasonableness was not reached); Mellon Mortg. Co.
v. Holder, 5 S.W.3d 654, 655 (Tex. 1999) (a sexual assault in a parking garage was deter-
mined on the basis of foreseeability without reaching unreasonableness); Trammell Crow
Central Texas, Ltd. v. Guitierrez, 267 S.W.3d 9, 9 (Tex. 2008) (liability for a parking lot
shooting was held to be unforeseeable without reaching the reasonableness test).
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prevent the risk.”548 The consideration of the unreasonableness test re-
quired separate elements with independent proof and could not be con-
sidered together with the foreseeability factor. Therefore, the court of
appeals failed to consider the unreasonableness of a foreseeable risk to
Petrie.549 Since Petrie offered no evidence on the foreseeability criteria,
and the appellate court did not consider that criteria independently, the
supreme court rendered judgment in favor of the property owner.550
Practitioners should take note that evidence must be presented of both
the foreseeability and the unreasonableness criteria with respect to a
premises liability claim based on a criminal act.
Additionally, there was a concurring opinion by two justices that ques-
tioned how courts should make decisions on the issue of duty when negli-
gence and proximate cause are typically within the providence of the
jury.551 As to these issues, the concurring justices noted they were “only
flagging these issues” and hoped “to kindle further study from the bench,
the bar, and academy.”552 This may be ripe ground for further
jurisprudence.
United Scaffolding, Inc. v. Levine553 involved a premises liability case
where the Texas Supreme Court distinguished pleadings based on general
negligence theory and premises liability theory. This case arose when a
pipe fitter, Levine, fell through a hole at Valero Energy Corporation’s
Port Arthur Refinery caused by unsecured planks in scaffolding erected
by an independent contractor, United Scaffolding, Inc. (USI). The basis
for USI’s appeal is that Levine submitted trial court evidence and jury
charges based on a general negligence theory even though all evidence
presented represented a premises liability theory issue. The majority’s
ruling strenuously affirms the supreme court’s prior holding in this regard
in Clayton W. Williams, Jr., Inc. v. Olivo554 and other cases for two de-
cades, noting that “a premises defect case improperly submitted to the
jury under only a general negligence question, without the elements of
premises liability as instructions or definitions, causes the rendition of an
improper judgment.”555 This is necessary, as the supreme court explains,
because a general negligence theory relates to “negligent activity encom-
pass[ing] a malfeasance . . . based on affirmative, contemporaneous con-
duct by the owner that caused the injury,” whereas a premises liability
theory “encompasses a nonfeasance theory based on the owner’s failure
to take measures to make the property safe.”556 Furthermore, for a prem-
ises liability case, the complaining parties are required to additionally
548. UDR Texas Props., 517 S.W.3d at 103.
549. Id.
550. Id.
551. Id. at 105–08 (Willett, J., concurring).
552. Id. at 108.
553. 537 S.W.3d 463, 467 (Tex. 2017).
554. Id. at 486 (citing 952 S.W.2d 523, 528–29 (Tex. 1997)).
555. Id. at 469–70 (citing Olivo, 952 S.W.2d at 529).
556. Id. at 471 (citing Delago Partners, Inc. v. Smith, 307 S.W.3d 762, 776 (Tex. 2010)).
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prove the Corbin elements.557
In analyzing the facts and pleadings, the supreme court noted that Le-
vine’s injury was a typical slip and fall case, which historically had been
treated as defect cases rather than ordinary general negligence cases.558
In such cases, the duty with respect to the premises was on the party that
had control of the premises.559 So, the issue of this case was whether the
premises were under the control of USI as the owner of the scaffolding
equipment (and which undertook the assembling, erection, and supervi-
sion of the scaffolding), or Valero, which owned the refinery premises and
determined when scaffolding was to be used. Looking at all of the evi-
dence and pleadings, the supreme court concluded that USI was in con-
trol of the scaffolding as a matter of law based upon contractual
obligations to erect, construct, and supervise the scaffolding.560 Valero’s
various scaffolding policies that required the contractor to insure the scaf-
folding was inspected before each work shift and gave the contractor sole
authority to authorize Valero employees’ use of the scaffolding also
played a role in the decision.561 The latter policy was applicable even
though USI did not have an employee inspect the scaffolding on the day
of its use.562 The supreme court concluded that “once Valero placed USI
in the sole position to authorize the use of scaffolds it constructed, USI
attained the sufficient right to control those scaffolds.”563
Further, the supreme court negated the theory that any joint control
which Valero may have had was relevant, noting that “the duty question
must focus on USI’s right to control the scaffold and subsequent responsi-
bility to warn about or remedy a dangerous condition on the scaffold,”
and “not whether Valero also had control.”564 This case supports existing
theory of law, but it is a clear warning to practitioners that the theory of
recovery must be appropriately pled and the evidence presented at trial
must support the theory raised. However, there was a three-justice dis-
senting opinion, vigorously opposed by the majority, alleging numerous
misstatements.565 Based on the number of dissenters, the continuing au-
thority of the United Scaffolding Inc. majority must be understood in the
context of the current supreme court makeup, and that its opinion may
change with subsequent changes in the court makeup.
557. The Corbin elements are “(1) that [the premises owner] had actual or constructive
knowledge of some condition on the premises; (2) that the condition posed an unreasona-
bleness risk of harm . . . ; (3) that [the premises owner] did not exercise reasonable care to
reduce or eliminate the risk; and (4) that [the premises owner’s] failure to use such care
proximately caused [the injury].” Corbin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 292, 296 (Tex.
1983).
558. United Scaffolding Inc., 537 S.W.3d at 472.
559. Id. at 473.
560. Id. at 478–79.
561. Id. at 475–76.
562. Id. at 478–79.
563. Id. at 479.
564. Id.
565. Id. at 483–501 (Boyd, J., dissenting).
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D. ENTITIES
Bruce v. Cauthen566 involved a U.C.C. foreclosure of a partner’s inter-
est in a limited partnership. Bruce and Cauthen were co-owners in a med-
ical staffing company, Alliance Recruiting Resources, and a partnership
owning undeveloped land, Kingwood Place Investments 1, LP. Bruce
owned 60.4% and Cauthen owned 39.6% of Alliance and Kingwood, and
Kingwood’s general partner was an entity owned entirely by Bruce. As
business disputes arose in Alliance, Cauthen resigned from Alliance but
maintained her interest in Kingwood. Pursuant to a buy-sell agreement
with respect to Alliance, Cauthen was entitled to a buyout payment.
However, Cauthen set up a competing business and filed suit against
Bruce for declaratory judgment, allowing her to continue in her business
and confirming she did not have trade secrets of Alliance.
As to the land development venture, Alliance had a “verbal lease” with
Kingwood for lease payments equaling the mortgage payments to be
made by Kingwood. Eventually, Bruce sent invoices to Cauthen for her
share of the mortgage payments, which she never made. Bruce attempted
to foreclose Cauthen’s limited partnership interest pursuant to a private
sale of collateral under U.C.C. Section 9.610.567 Cauthen argued this was
a wrongful foreclosure since Section 9.610 requires a disposal of collateral
in a commercially reasonable manner, and that a secured party may not
purchase the collateral if the private sale is not of collateral of a kind that
is “customarily sold on a recognized market or the subject of widely dis-
tributed standard price quotations.”568 Therefore, Cauthen argued that
since the foreclosure could not have occurred under Section 9.610, it must
have occurred under Section 9.620,569 which requires the debtor’s written
consent, which she claimed she never gave.570 However, Bruce argued
that U.C.C. Section 9.610(c) may be modified by agreement of the par-
ties, and asserts that the limited partnership agreement of the parties is
such a written modification specifically allowing a private sale to a re-
stricted class of purchasers, and that Bruce met the definition for such a
restricted purchaser.571
A partnership agreement provision granted to a non-defaulting part-
ner, as a secured party, a lien, and right to foreclose the lien in accor-
dance with the Texas U.C.C.572 This provision expressed (1) “that the
partners acknowledge[d] that [a public sale would be unlikely due to se-
curities law restrictions]”; (2) that a “private sale[ ] to a restricted group
of purchasers [would probably need to occur]”; (3) that a “private sale
[might] result in prices [and] terms less favorable [than a public sale];”
and (4) “each partner agree[d] that [such] a private sale [would be] com-
566. 515 S.W.3d 495, 500 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. denied).
567. Id. at 500–01; see TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.610 (West 2017).
568. Bruce, 515 S.W.3d at 503.
569. Id.; see TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.620 (West 2017).
570. Bruce, 515 S.W.3d at 503.
571. Id. at 503–04.
572. Id. at 504.
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mercially reasonable.”573 Despite seemingly addressing the requirements
under U.C.C. Section 9.610(c), the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals
determined this language was insufficient because: (1) the partnership
agreement did not have express language that such provision was a modi-
fication of U.C.C. Section 9.610(c); (2) the provision had no language
permitting a secured party (a partner) to acquire the defaulting party’s
partnership interest at a private sale; and (3) the provision did not ex-
pressly modify U.C.C. Section 9.610(c) to allow the potential purchaser to
be a limited partner who was also a secured party.574 Consequently, the
court held that the lack of such express language would be insufficient to
constitute an appropriate modification under U.C.C. Section 9.610(c).575
For practitioners, applicable remedy provisions of your partnership
agreement should be modified to specify these points.
Siddiqui v. Fancy Bites, LLC576 is a rather complex set of facts, which
principally addressed the issue of informal fiduciary duty. To simplify the
facts, the two Siddiqui brothers (Brothers) owned a construction com-
pany, Suncoast Environmental and Construction, and land upon which
construction was being undertaken for a Hartz Chicken restaurant. The
Brothers met Qureshi and Ali (collectively, Investors) and began to con-
sider a new business venture for the completion of the first Hartz
Chicken location (Brammel property), the acquisition of land (currently
owned by Qureshi), and the development of a new Hartz Chicken restau-
rant (Antoine property). Qureshi and Ali each invested money to own a
25% interest in two entities, Quick Eats LLC and Fancy Bites LLC,
owned by the Brothers. In connection with this investment, the Brothers
represented that the Brammel property was owned by one of these two
entities. However, the Brammel property was actually owned by Sunny-
land Development, Inc. (which was wholly owned by the Brothers).
When the two restaurant businesses failed, the parties filed suit alleging
various acts of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty.
The Investors alleged various wrongdoings with respect to the con-
struction of the two projects by the Brothers and Suncoast. However, the
construction contract was between Suncoast (a Qureshi owned construc-
tion company) and Blueline Real Estate, LP, a limited partnership that
owned the Brammel property, and of which Fancy Bites and Quick Eats
were the general and limited partners. The Brothers challenged the stand-
ing of the Investors to sue for construction costs related claims, since the
contracts were between Blueline and Suncoast. Blueline subsequently
filed for bankruptcy and was dropped from the suit. The Fourteenth
Houston Court of Appeals concluded that the Investors had no standing
to challenge the construction cost aspects since they were Blueline’s
claims and not the individual equity owners.577 Consequently, all claims
573. Id.
574. Id. at 505.
575. Id.
576. 504 S.W.3d 349, 364 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied).
577. Id. at 361.
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for overcharging and unjust enrichment related to the construction cost
claims were dismissed.578
Further, the Investors alleged damages which they would not have in-
curred but for the breach of the fiduciary duty owed to them by the
Brothers. The court noted the standard rule that “fiduciary duty arises as
a matter of law in certain formal relationships such as attorney-client or
trustee relationship[s];” however, an “informal fiduciary duty may arise
from a moral, social, domestic or purely personal relationship of trust and
confidence.”579 “To impose an informal fiduciary duty in a business trans-
action, the special relationship of trust and confidence must exist before
and apart from the agreement made the basis of the suit.”580 Since there
had been no formal relationship between the Brothers and the Investors
prior to this specific investment, the requirements for an informal fiduci-
ary duty were not present.581 Nevertheless, the Investors sought an ex-
ception to this rule for special circumstances or facts warranting the
expansion of the rule. However, no such special relationship or facts were
warranted by the contracts between the parties—specifically where the
LLC agreements provided all partners were co-equal managers and own-
ers, permitted the LLCs and Blueline to contract with affiliates, and spec-
ified that Suncoast would perform the buildout and construction for the
two restaurants.582 The testimony evidenced that the Investors had suffi-
cient ability to engage in a financial review of the entities’ affairs as well
as having some operational control of the entities that negated any ex-
pansion of the rule’s requirements for finding an informal fiduciary
duty.583
Although the Brothers were successful on the previously mentioned
fronts, the Investors were successful in proving fraud in the inducement
by the Brothers with respect to the Investors’ acquisition of the 50% in-
terest in the two entities. The Brothers’ statement that the Brammel
property was owned by either Blueline, Fancy Bites, or Quick Eats was
deemed to have been a known misrepresentation, which was sufficient to
cause a fraudulent inducement.584 The fact that the Brothers ultimately
conveyed the title to the Brammel property from Sunnyland into Blueline
in connection with obtaining a construction loan for the Antoine property
was not sufficient to overcome the initial misrepresentation and did not
eliminate damage.585 Therefore, practitioners should take note that cor-
rection of such misrepresentations will not be sufficient to cure the actual
fraudulent misrepresentation even if a cure is accomplished, and should
pay attention to the exact entities that are parties to a document.
578. Id. 362.
579. Id. at 364–65 (citing Meyer v. Cathey, 167 S.W.3d 327, 331 (Tex. 2005)).
580. Id. at 365 (citing Meyer, 167 S.W.3d at 331; Ritchie v. Rupe, 443 S.W.3d 856, 874
n.27 (Tex. 2014)).
581. Id. at 365–66.
582. Id. at 367.
583. Id. at 367–68.
584. Id. at 369–71.
585. Id. at 371.
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In Mission Grove, L.P. v. Hall,586 Mission Grove (Developer) signed a
contract (Contract) with Texas Classic Homes (Builder) to be the exclu-
sive builder for a subdivision. The Contract was signed by Hall, as the
president of Builder. Paragraph 11 of the Contract provided in part “[t]he
obligations under this agreement are also the personal obligations of the
builder representative signing below.”587 Builder filed for bankruptcy and
did not perform under the Contract. Developer sued Hall personally for
breach of contract, and Hall filed a motion for summary judgment on the
basis that he did not sign the contract in his individual capacity. More
than four years later, Developer amended the original petition to include
additional claims for promissory estoppel, fraud, and negligent misrepre-
sentation. Hall filed a second motion for summary judgment, claiming
that the four year statute of limitations had expired. The trial court
granted both motions for summary judgment, and Developer appealed.
The Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court
that Hall was not personally liable under the Contract, and reversed and
remanded the case for further proceedings relating to the other claims. In
handing down their decision, the court reiterated the basic and well es-
tablished tenet of agency law that a person making or purporting to make
a contract with another as an agent for a disclosed principal does not
become a party to the contract unless the parties have otherwise
agreed.588 Developer argued that the language in Paragraph 11 of the
Contract clearly indicated the parties’ intent for Hall to be personally
bound. With respect to the Paragraph 11 language, the court stated it
would have been a closer decision had the language named Hall specifi-
cally instead of merely reciting “the builder representative signing be-
low.”589 The court also cited an analogous case590 in which one place in
the body of an airplane lease identified an individual person as the lessee
along with the statement, “I am responsible for the operational contract
of the aircraFort”.591 Despite the statement of responsibility, the Prent
court found that, when interpreting the lease as a whole, it was unambig-
uous that the lease was executed in a representative capacity on behalf of
the entity and not in the individual’s personal capacity.592 This case high-
lights the critical importance for practitioners to carefully draft or review
documents to verify the content is as intended.
E. NUISANCE
Two notable cases dealt with the area of nuisance. In Crosstex N. Tex.
586. 503 S.W.3d 546 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.).
587. Id. at 552.
588. Id. at 552.
589. Id. at 553.
590. Id. (citing Prent v. rJet, L.L.C., No. 01-14-00408-CV, 2015 WL 1020207, at *2–4
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 5, 2015, no pet) (mem. op.)).
591. Id.
592. Id.
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Pipeline, L.P. v. Gardner,593 the Texas Supreme Court confirmed its rule
that the defendant’s liability for creating a nuisance does not depend sim-
ply on showing that the defendant acted or used the property illegally or
unlawfully. Rather “a defendant can be liable for creating a nuisance
based on ‘negligence or other culpable conduct.’”594 The complained of
acts involved a natural gas line compressor station that generated contin-
uous loud noise and vibrations. The supreme court noted that the claimed
nuisance did not refer to the wrongful act or to damages, but to the injury
itself.595 “The interference [must be] ‘substantial’ and cause[ ] ‘discomfort
or annoyance’ that is ‘unreasonable.’”596 In this case, “the evidence was
legally sufficient to support the jury’s finding” that the compressor station
created a condition on the neighbor’s property that “substantially inter-
fered” with the neighbor’s use and enjoyment of their land and thus cre-
ated a nuisance.597 But note, in 1717 Bissonnet, LLC v. Loughhead,598
the construction of a high-rise building in a residential neighborhood did
not constitute an actionable nuisance. Part of the problem with the Bis-
sonnet case was that much of the argument was about a prospective nui-
sance rather than a current interference.599
XI. CONCLUSION
Texas law now recognizes text messages as a means for notifying of a
change of address prior to foreclosure, requiring additional inquiries for
the practitioner. Although the full scope of materiality with regards to
correction instruments may not be known, practitioners should be careful
in their analysis of, and compliance with, the details of the statutory re-
quirements to avoid a correction instrument being declared void. And, in
the unusual Villanova case, the scope of personal knowledge of a corpo-
rate officer for an affidavit in support of a motion for summary judgment
is detailed. Practitioners should conform to such knowledge requirements
in their supporting affidavits.
In drafting guaranty instruments, particular attention must be used to
describe the triggering event, such as for a precedent sale of property
(i.e., a voluntary sale or a foreclosure) or how much underlying debt must
be paid (i.e., any payment amount or a threshold payment amount). The
effectiveness of email signatures, whether typed at the bottom of a mes-
sage or merely automatically inserted in the “from” field in an email, is
now subject to a split of authority between Texas appellate courts. Will
the Texas Supreme Court intervene?
593. 505 S.W.3d 580, 601 (Tex. 2016).
594. Id. at 602 (quoting Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co. v Oakes, 58 S.W. 999, 1002–03 (Tex.
1900)).
595. Id. at 584–90 n.2.
596. Id. at 595.
597. Id. at 612.
598. 500 S.W.3d 488 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.).
599. Id. at 497.
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As a matter of first impression, practitioners must now be aware of the
strict adherence to claim filing deadlines under the statutory Texas Wind-
storm Insurance Association Act. Additionally, there is now Texas Su-
preme Court authority rejecting Fisher in premises liability cases,
clarifying that neither employers nor agents of a premises owner are cov-
ered by the owner premises liability statute. Further, and most impor-
tantly, as a matter of first impression, the Texas Supreme Court has
announced the dual mandate of reasonableness and foreseeability in the
context of a premises liability case based upon a third party criminal act.
Property owners who control their premises have a duty to use ordinary
care to protect invitees from known or reasonably foreseeable criminal
acts which have an unreasonable and foreseeable risk of harm.
As with previous years, the courts dealt with several cases where they
made it abundantly clear that when it comes to draconian results, or
harsh consequences such as a forfeiture, you must draft the agreement
and the specific provision very carefully and very clearly. This was the
case in Shields, where the Texas Supreme Court reached the correct con-
clusion, and found that a non-waiver clause had not been waived because
the clause clearly addressed the behavior in question. Unfortunately, the
Shields case also made it clear that the Texas courts would unlikely up-
hold a generic waiver clause, particularly if the result of upholding such a
clause would result in forfeiture for one party.
Unfortunately, as frustrating as the holding in Shields may be for the
average practitioner looking for guidance on how to draft an effective
non-waiver clause, most practitioners are crossing their fingers that the
Texas Supreme Court will overturn the Amarillo Court of Appeals hold-
ing in Tregellas v. Archer Trust.600 As discussed in greater detail above, in
Tregellas, the court found that an option contract to purchase real estate
was not a real property right, but a contract right. This distinction essen-
tially resulted in a forfeiture for the option holder, and the holding has
potentially wide-ranging and severe consequences for the transactional
world where options are used every day and parties pay valuable money
to secure them. One can only hope the supreme court handles the case in
the manner of the Shields case, so that holders of options to purchase real
property do not find themselves unexpectedly holding very expensive,
but meaningless, pieces of paper.
However, the courts continued to relax rules of drafting and interpreta-
tion in the context of conveyancing. The “Four Corners Rule” has be-
come the dominant focus for a court being asked to find the parties’
intent within the document. A similar analysis applied to restrictions,
homeowners associations, and condominiums.
Important changes in jurisprudence occurred in home equity lending.
An attempted lien—under the Texas Constitution Article XVI
§ 50(a)(6)—remained “not valid” until cured, such that limitations did
600. 507 S.W.3d 423, 437 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2016, pet. granted).
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not bar a challenge. And forfeiture was not an independent cause of ac-
tion, but rather a remedy under the loan documents.
Finally, practitioners should note new Texas Property Code Section
12.0071, addressing expungement of a notice of lis pendens. In response
to a pending Supreme Court case potentially undermining the effect of an
order of expungement, the Texas Legislature took steps to make its intent
clear that the expungement cleared the property title for transfer over
any matters asserted in the litigation.
